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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

STUDY MISSION TO CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

(DECEMBER 8-20, 1988)

REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

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SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

(100th Congress)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From December 8–20, 1988, the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control conducted a Study Mission of drug production and trafficking in Mexico and the Caribbean. The delegation consisted of the following Members of the Select Committee, Chairman Charles B. Rangel, Ranking Minority Member Benjamin A. Gilman, and Reps. Frank J. Guarini, Walter E. Fauntroy, William J. Hughes, and Solomon P. Ortiz. Other Members of Congress participating in the Study Mission were Reps. George W. Crockett, Jr., Guy Vander Jagt, Ron de Lugo, and Kweisi Mfume. Staff of the Select Committee assisting the delegation included, Edward H. Jurith, Staff Director; Elliott A. Brown, Minority Staff Director; and other professional staff members.

The delegation visited the following countries: Mexico (Dec. 8–11); Belize (Dec. 11); Jamaica (Dec. 11–13); Cuba (Dec. 13–14); Dominican Republic (Dec. 14–17); Guyana (Dec. 17); Trinidad and Tobago (Dec. 17–20); and Venezuela (Dec. 20). The Members met with the heads of State in all the nations visited except Venezuela. These included President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (Mexico), Prime Minister Manuel Esquivel (Belize), Prime Minister Edward Seaga (Jamaica), President Fidel Castro (Cuba), President Joaquin Balaguer (Dominican Republic), President Desmond Hoyte (Guyana) and Prime Minister Arthur Robinson (Trinidad and Tobago). The delegation also met with the Foreign Ministers, Ministers of Justice, Attorneys General, Police and Health officials in the countries visited.

These included: *Mexico*, Attorney General Enrique Alvarez del Castillo, Secretary of Government Fernando Gutierrez Barrios, Foreign Minister Fernando Solano Moralas, Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Antonion Rivello Bazan; *Belize*, Deputy Prime Minister Curl Thompson, Foreign Minister Dean Barrow; *Jamaica*, National Security Minister Errol Anderson, Chief of the Jamaican Constabulary Force Ricketts, Chief of Staff of the Jamaican Defense Forces Major General Neish; *Cuba*, Minister of Education Jose Fernandez, Minister of Justice Juan Escalona, Attorney General Ramon de la Cruz; *Guyana*, Prime Minister Hamilton Green, Opposition Leader Cheddi Jagan, Foreign Minister Rashleigh Esmond Jackson; *Trinidad and Tobago*, Dr. Peter Lewis, Chairman of the Technical Advisory Committee on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, Anthony Carmona, Department of Public Prosecution, Col. Ralph Brown, Commander of the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment, Supt. David Jack, Chief of the Narcotics Squad of the Police Service Nizam Mohammed, Speaker, Trinidad House of Representatives, Michael Williams, President, Trinidad Senate.

The delegation was struck with the strong sense of concern expressed by the various national leaders with whom the Committee met over rising levels of drug trafficking and drug abuse in the

Western Hemisphere. It became increasingly clear to the delegation that a unique opportunity exists at the present time for an effective regional effort, throughout the Western Hemisphere, to come to grips with the power and influence of the narco-trafficking organizations that are dominating the political landscape of the region.

In Mexico, the delegation was truly impressed by the commitment of the new Salinas Government to combat drug trafficking and by President Salinas' personal determination to "make life miserable for drug traffickers in Mexico, before they make life in Mexico miserable."

In Belize, the Members were moved by the determination of the Equivel Government to insure that their emerging nation does not become a haven for drug trafficking, while at the same time trying to increase economic opportunity for the people of Belize.

In Jamaica, the Committee was impressed with the dedication of the Jamaican military, police, and people in continuing an effective marijuana eradication program, and at the same time having the courage to not only rebuild Jamaica in the wake of destruction left by Hurricane Gilbert, but to enhance the infrastructure of Jamaica. In Cuba, the delegation was struck with the sincere willingness of President Castro to be involved in narcotics control efforts in Latin America, and to future cooperation with the U.S. on drug matters as a result. The delegation strongly urged President Castro to expeditiously release any and all of the remaining long-term political prisoners in the name of human rights and dignity, and in accordance with international agreements. The President informed the delegation that he would seriously consider their request.*

In the Dominican Republic the Committee was impressed by the continued efforts of Dominican officials to track, identify, and apprehend drug traffickers operating through and in its territory; and in Guyana, the Members were moved by the determination of the Hoyte Government to prevent a drug abuse situation developing in their country through its adoption of comprehensive anti-drug legislation.

The delegation was appreciative of the efforts by the Robinson Government in Trinidad and Tobago in launching a national crusade against drugs. As a result of information obtained in Belize, Guyana, Trinidad, and Tobago regarding the critical role played by DEA personnel in the region, the delegation decided to stop over in Caracas, Venezuela on the return trip home, to talk with the U.S. Ambassador and the DEA country attache about increasing agents' presence in the region.

The time is ripe for drug policy makers to act upon this new era of awareness in the Western Hemisphere of the need for a coordinated, allied commitment against drug abuse and drug trafficking. The Select Committee urges the new Bush Administration to respond to this new atmosphere as quickly as possible and call upon all the nations of the region to join with the U.S. in a Western Hemispheric Summit on drugs in order to develop an appropriate strategy for success in this area.

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* On January 6, 1989 President Castro announced the release of 44 political prisoners that had been previously deemed to be too dangerous to be released.

MEXICO

COUNTRY TEAM BRIEFING

On its arrival in Mexico City on December 8, 1988, the delegation went directly to the American Embassy for a briefing on the narcotics situation in Mexico.

Mexico is the largest single source country of heroin and marijuana available in the United States. The State Department estimates that in 1987, net Mexican production totaled 6,550 metric tons of marijuana (as compared to 4,000–6,000 metric tons in 1986), and 45–55 metric tons of opium (as compared to 35–50 tons in 1986). Preliminary estimates for 1988 show increases in net production for both marijuana and opium.

DEA reports that about 7,300 hectares of opium poppy were cultivated in Mexico during 1987. An estimated 4,400–7,200 hectares were cultivated in 1986. Figures by the Office of the Mexican Attorney General (PGR) indicate that 2,528 hectares of opium were eradicated in 1987. Preliminary figures for 1988 reveal that 2,431 hectares were eradicated as of November 30.

There are two important factors regarding Mexican opium cultivation that should be noted; the expansion of growing area and year-round cultivation. These factors indicate that previous crop estimates may have underestimated the potential for opium production in Mexico.

Heroin conversion labs are located throughout Mexico and are usually no more than a temporary set-up. The total number of operational labs in Mexico is estimated to be in the hundreds. Very few labs are seized. In 1987, the PGR reported seizing 7 labs, and 9 in 1988.

In recent years, drug traffickers have encouraged the cultivation of marijuana in non-traditional growing areas, so that marijuana is now grown in virtually all parts of Mexico. An estimated 9,000 hectares of cannabis were cultivated in 1987. Figures provided by the PGR indicate that 3,580 hectares were eradicated in 1987. Preliminary figures for 1988 reveal that 3,939 hectares were eradicated as of November 30.

A serious drought may have decreased the illicit crop harvest in early 1988. But intelligence reports indicate that the fall crop for both opium and cannabis are quite large.

Although not a source country for cocaine, it is estimated that one-third of all the cocaine entering the United States transits Mexico. It has become increasingly evident that Colombian cocaine trafficking organizations are establishing a strong foothold in Mexico which is increasing the trafficking of that drug to the U.S., and creating a major threat for Mexican law enforcement agencies to deal with.

Upon its arrival for the briefing the delegation was aware that the Mexican eradication/enforcement program in conjunction with DEA had been plagued by many difficulties. The aerial eradication program has had a series of management inefficiencies that prevent the air fleet from operating at full capacity, thereby limiting eradication. A new maintenance contract was recently signed with Bell Helicopter in June, 1988, and the delegation look forward to

hearing how the new maintenance agreement was working. DEA's presence in Mexico in recent months has been inhibited by threats and acts of harassment directed against the agents and their families. DEA dissatisfaction with the results and competence of Operation Vanguard, its joint eradication verification program with the PGR led to its suspension in April, 1988. Official corruption in Mexico continues to remain as a serious impediment to the success of any drug control program in the country.

Roger Gamble, the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), conducted the briefing for the delegation. He stated that he was optimistic about the future of U.S.-Mexican narcotics control efforts because of the emphasis to be placed upon drug control matters by the new Salinas Administration. He pointed to the recent meeting of President-elect Bush and President Salinas in Houston, and their pledge to make narcotics control a top priority between the two nations as an exciting development. Gamble stated that the new Mexican administration "has the proper attitude" and that the appointments by President Salinas to narcotics related posts thus far had shown that he is sensitive to the problems of the past.

Edward Heath, the DEA Country Attache, stated that although it was too early to tell what the future will hold for narcotics control efforts in Mexico, he concurred in Gamble's assessment that the attitude and appointments thus far by the Salinas Administration are encouraging. Heath voiced his opinion that the Salinas Government knows that it must "show results" in the narcotics area in order to sustain its credibility, and that it recognizes the depth of the problem.

Heath also stated that the Mexicans understand the serious threat presented to them by the Colombian trafficking organizations. He pointed out that the Colombian groups had "infiltrated" the Mexican system and are systematically corrupting it for its own ends. Concerning corruption, the DEA Attaché noted that the Salinas Administration was determined not to be tarnished by the brush of corruption as its predecessors. Heath stated that the government has asked for the names of corrupt police officials and that they will purge them. Heath also indicated that the Salinas Administration has signaled it will press for a resolution of the Camarena and Cortez incidents, as well as other Acts of harassment against DEA personnel in Mexico under serious investigation.

The delegation questioned Heath about the DEA staffing levels in Mexico. Heath pointed out that his authorized staffing level is 41 agents, but that he only has 20 in place at the present time. The Camarena and Cortez incident, as well as other Acts of harassment directed at DEA personnel in Mexico has made it difficult for DEA to place agents in-country. In response to a question by Mr. Hughes, Heath stated that the fact that he was only at half agent strength has not affected his case load and that all the agents were "keeping busy".

The embassy officials pointed out that the new administration feels a sense of urgency about the narcotics situation, and that they know that in addition to the numerous arrests they made at the lower levels they must begin to break the backs of the trafficking organizations and begin to arrest some higher-ups. This will send a key signal that the Salinas Administration means business.

In closing, Mr. Gamble pointed out that the Mexicans, in turn, were looking for a signal from the U.S. that it too was serious about combatting drug abuse, beyond political statements. The Mexicans, he stated, were keenly interested in demand reduction activities in the United States. He urged frank, candid discussions with Mexican officials as the best way to build upon a new era of cooperation with the Salinas Administration in narcotics control.

Meeting With Representatives of Mexico Responsible for Narcotics Control

Mexico City, Mexico—December 8, 1988

Mexican officials: Ambassador Gonzalez Galvez, Under Secretary of Foreign Relations.
Lic. Luis Porte Petit, Deputy Attorney General.
Lic. Gonzalo Armienta, Government.
Lic. Ortiz Monasterios, Director General of Human Rights, Government Ambassador Ignacio Villasenor.
Lic. Consul Edgardo Flores Rivas, Director General of Consular Services.
Lic. Jose Antonio Gonzalez Fernandes, Personal Secretary of Ambassador Gonzalez Galvez.
Ambassador Walter Astie Burgos, Director General for North America.

On December 8, the U.S. delegation met with Mexican policymakers in the new Federal government, who will be responsible for narcotics control. The Mexican officials were led by the Under Secretary of Foreign Relations, Ambassador Gonzalez Galvez, and Deputy Attorney General, Lic. Luis Porte Petit.

The Under Secretary of Foreign Relations welcomed the Select Committee delegation. He emphasized that Mexican-United States relations had a long history and that they were complex, touching many policy areas. Thus, this relationship could not be defined within the context of one issue. The Under Secretary expressed, on behalf of the Mexican government, the wish to cooperate with the United States on narcotics matters.

Chairman Rangel, speaking on behalf of the U.S. Congressional delegation, spoke of the need for the Mexican and U.S. governments to make a commitment to fight the drug problem, thereby sending a message to the world. Mr. Rangel praised the efforts made by Jose Gonzalez, the personal secretary to Ambassador Galvez, to understand how the United States Congress was attempting to deal with the narcotics problem. He also briefly outlined the new omnibus anti-drug legislation that had been enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1988.

A variety of issues were addressed during the meeting. The different perspectives of the two governments and the points of agreement emerged during the discussions.

The Mexican officials expressed concern over attacks against Mexico for the drug problem—attacks made by certain American politicians during the 1988 election campaigns. The Mexicans asserted that before U.S. officials resorted to the media, there should be a dialogue between U.S. and Mexican officials over matters of mutual interest. They suggested that better dialogue could address

the problems of lack of information, misinformation, and disinformation that waste time and squander resources.

In response to the drug problem, the Mexican officials indicated that within Mexico domestic anti-drug measures were being adopted. Moreover, within the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C., an office had been established, previously headed by Jose Gonzalez, for the purpose of establishing better relations with the United States on the narcotics issue by eliminating hurdles, disavowing misinformation, and discussing these matters in a clear and friendly way.

The U.S. delegation was told that the Mexican will on narcotics matters was clear. President Salinas, in his inaugural address, had indicated the attitude that would be adopted in the fight against drug traffickers and that action would be immediate. Proposals of the new Mexican President dealing with the drug issue include: doubling the budget of the Attorney General; amending the by-laws of the Attorney General's office to establish a specialized office to combat drug trafficking; and introducing reform legislation in the Mexican House to increase sanctions and awards for drug trafficking and for money laundering and to provide for the securing chattel goods and real estate of those engaged in drug trafficking. In addition, in the past few months, 19 new helicopters were purchased by the Mexican government.

Attacking the profits of drug traffickers by developing effective laws to control money laundering emerged as an issue of shared Mexican/U.S. concern. The Mexican officials articulated their intent to revise their laws to address the problem of money laundering more effectively and expressed interest in learning what initiatives in this area had been taken in the anti-drug legislation passed by the U.S. Congress.

Congressman William Hughes, a Member of the U.S. delegation, had overseen, as Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Crime, the development of U.S legislation to control money laundering, the most recent being the provisions in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. He indicated that, while U.S. laws work well there, these specific intitatives might not fit the Mexican situation. He went on to suggest that while Mexican officials might have to custom tailor laws to address their money laundering problem, it would be useful to share information from the U.S. experience in order that the Mexicans might benefit from U.S. mistakes in this area. The Mexican officials agreed that this would be useful and that they would be pleased to open dialogue on this issue.

Another matter of shared interest was the seizure of the assets of drug traffickers. The U.S. delegation reported that asset forfeiture initiatives in the United States had been successful. In Mexico, asset forfeiture legislation had been enacted during the de la Madrid Administration. The Mexican officials indicated that these efforts had been successful.

The U.S. delegation raised with the Mexicans several other matters of special concern. These included: the progress of the investigation into the death of Drug Enforcement Administration agent Enrique Camarena; the appointment as Attorney General of Enrique Alvarez del Castillo, former governor of Jalisco, one of the worst drug trafficking areas and the place where Camarena had been killed; efforts being undertaken by the Mexican government

to reduce drug-related corruption among Mexican officials; and the Mexican government's perspective on several proposals in the 1988 U.S. omnibus anti-drug legislation, including provisions calling for the convening of a Western Hemispheric summit on drugs and the establishment of a multi-national inter-American anti-narcotics police force. The Mexican officials were very sensitive about all of these issues.

With respect to the Camarena case, while indicating that the investigation was proceeding, the Mexican officials asserted that Mexican police were also dying in the fight against drugs and they were dying for U.S. children as well as Mexican children; they did not make distinctions. Yet, the United States did not seem to recognize the sacrifices being made by Mexicans in the fight against drugs. They indicated that the fact that people were dying in Jalisco was evidence that a fight against drug traffickers was going on, not that the drug problem was necessarily worse there.

Regarding the new Attorney General, the Mexican officials told the delegation that as governor of Jalisco Enrique Alvarez del Castillo had not been responsible for enforcing drug laws. These laws were Federal not local laws. Moreover, he had become governor after the Camarena killing.

Concerning drug-related corruption, the Mexican officials indicated both their awareness of the problem and their intent to institute reforms to combat it, e.g., by revising the statutes to provide for the more thorough investigation of money laundering. Moreover, they informed the U.S. delegation that all Mexicans are being asked to denounce corruption and to bring forward the proof necessary to prosecute those involved in such activities.

The Mexican officials raised serious reservations about the proposal in the 1988 U.S. omnibus drug legislation calling on the President of the United States to convene a Western Hemispheric summit. Specifically, they objected to language calling for the U.S. President to convene the conference, because the summit would involve other nations and this proposal was only a matter of U.S. law. They argued that the proposal had not been negotiated with the other countries that were to participate. The Mexican officials did not, however, rule out the possibility of having such a summit. There was no official position taken on the summit during the meeting. It was suggested that with consultation and understanding, Mexicans are usually willing to use any forum necessary to reach a solution. In short, the primary objection to the summit was the manner in which it was proposed rather than the concept itself.

The proposed anti-narcotics police force also generated significant objections from the Mexicans. According to the Mexican officials, the concept of an inter-American police force in Latin America had been proposed much earlier. It had been proposed by political leaders no longer in power. Because of the "checkered" history of the idea, the concept was not easy for them to accept.

The discussions regarding the Inter-American proposals in the 1988 drug legislation generated adverse comments about the U.S. policy of certifying whether drug producing or trafficking countries are cooperating with the U.S. to combat the narcotics problem and linking the receipt of U.S. foreign aid to that certification. One

Mexican official articulated his desire to look at U.S. marijuana production and eradication efforts in Hawaii, suggesting he was concerned about what the U.S. was doing about the drug problem, particularly its domestic marijuana cultivation. Another Mexican official criticized the certification concept. He asked whether the U.S. delegation would want Mexico to certify whether the U.S. was doing enough regarding the consumption of drugs in the United States and if Mexico did not certify that enough was being done, Mexico could cancel its debt to the U.S. He suggested it was difficult for one country to accept another country's unilateral view.

Members of the U.S. Congressional delegation asserted throughout the meeting that much of the language with which the Mexicans were having difficulty and the certification process, as well, were primarily directed toward the U.S. Administration. These actions were taken by the U.S. Congress because the U.S. Administration was viewed by the Congress as not doing enough to address the drug crisis. The Congress was by these proposals trying to give the U.S. Administration new tools with which to combat the narcotics problem.

The meeting ended on the note that it was through cooperation that a solution to the drug problem would be found. The need and desire for dialogue in order to achieve cooperation and effective inter-American anti-narcotics policies were reiterated by Mexican officials throughout the meeting and affirmed by the U.S. delegation. The Mexican officials indicated that they just did not want to be crushed by U.S. efforts to arrest the drug problem.

MEETING WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL ENRIQUE ALVAREZ DEL CASTILLO

The delegation met with the new Mexican Attorney General, Enrique Alvarez del Castillo, on Friday morning, December 9, 1988. Prior to his appointment as Attorney General, Mr. Alvarez served as the Governor of the Jalisco State. The Jalisco state was where the kidnapping and murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena took place. It was because of his experience with the investigation into that matter, as well as his strong legal and judicial background, that President Salinas chose him to be the Attorney General. Prior to his service as the Governor of Jalisco, Alvarez served on the Mexican Supreme Court and as a Professor of Law.

The Attorney General opened the meeting by stating that he plans an activist role against drug production and trafficking in Mexico. Mr. Alvarez outlined for the members the new reorganization of the Attorney General's office which will create a new department to deal exclusively with narcotics investigations and prosecutions. In addition to special investigations of drug trafficking organizations, increased penalties will be adopted directed against drug-related crimes. The Attorney General also stated as part of the reorganization of his department, another new division specializing in international relations will be established. A key duty of this new division will be to have a visible presence in Washington, D.C.

In addition to reorganization, the Attorney General also announced to the delegation that the new Administration will increase the budget of his department by over 100%.

Alvarez outlined a series of legal reforms his department will promote in its campaign against drug trafficking. As part of this effort, Mexican legal experts will examine recent legislative actions in the United States. Among the new legal areas to be examined are money laundering controls, criminal and civil forfeitures, and the seizures of chattels and real estate connected with drug trafficking operations. He asked for the assistance of the U.S. delegation in this effort to enhance the weapons in Mexico's arsenal to combat the drug trafficking organizations.

The Attorney General also emphasized his commitment to continue Mexico's narcotic crop eradication campaign in conjunction with the Mexican Armed Forces. Mr. Alvarez underscored that this activity, along with that of a vigorous prosecution of drug trafficking offenders and forfeiting their resources, will have a significant impact on the drug problem affecting Mexico and the United States.

Alvarez called for the swift ratification of the December, 1987, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) signed by the U.S. and Mexico. The Mexican Congress has ratified the treaty, but the U.S. Senate has yet to do so. He indicated that ratification will go a long way to improve Mexico-U.S. cooperation in law enforcement matters.

In discussing the reorganization of his office, the members of the delegation pointed to the creation in the United States of a cabinet-level "drug czar" to coordinate Federal anti-drug activities. In response, the Attorney General will be in charge of Mexico's drug abuse program. As part of this initiative, however, he recognized that new initiatives must reach out to those parts of Mexican society involved in drug abuse prevention and education efforts.

Mr. Ortiz inquired of the Attorney General about the lack of jail space within the Mexican correctional system to incarcerate those arrested and charged with drug offense. In this regard, Mr. Ortiz pointed to recent events in the State of Sonora where 3,000 individuals have been arrested, but only 83 jailed. Mr. Alvarez conceded that this was a problem facing Mexico, and that their was a clear need for his government to expand prison capacity. As part of this effort, however, the Attorney General indicated that his office will be studying the types of offenders that require incarceration and those that could be referred to other types of sentences.

The Attorney General closed the meeting on the note that it is imperative that we increase the awareness of all countries of the world as to the dangers of drug abuse. As part of this awareness, Mr. Alvarez stated that communication and coordination between allies in this struggle is of the upmost importance. Chairman Rangel agreed with this conclusion and stated that we cannot let our differences overcome our national wills to conquer the political and social problems represented by drug trafficking. In this vein the Chairman noted that the new drug bill passed by the U.S. Congress was more a reflection of what the United States needed to do as part of its responsibility to combat international drug trafficking, and not an attempt to impose standards or demands on other nations involved in this fight.

MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF GOVERNMENT, FERNANDO GUTIERREZ BARRIOS

The delegation next met with the Mexican Secretary of Government, Fernando Gutierrez Barrios. The Secretary of Government in Mexico is responsible for coordinating the actions of the various State governments in Mexico to insure that their policies are consistent with those of the Federal government.

Mr. Gutierrez stated that he viewed the fight against drug trafficking as a permanent struggle that will require the joint coordination of both the Mexican and U.S. Governments. He indicated that just as he must coordinate this activity with the various state governments in Mexico, we must establish the same type of coordination between Mexican and U.S. drug control officials.

The Secretary stated that in the Salinas Administration the drug problem will be attacked at its roots. He stated that over the last few years those involved with the problem have become keenly aware of the nature of the drug problem and how to tackle it.

The Chairman and Mr. Crockett discussed with the Secretary the issue of U.S. certification of drug producing countries as a predicate for U.S. assistance. Judge Crockett pointed out the difficulties in this process and the Chairman noted that the entire certification issues was as much a reflection of U.S. Congressional frustration with the State Department for its handling of international narcotics matters, as it was frustration with international drug production. In response, Mr. Gutierrez stated that it was his opinion that the program to be implemented by the Salinas Administration will bring the type of results that "are properly demanded by your constituents".

In a concluding statement on behalf of the delegation, Mr. Hughes noted that both Mexicans and Americans are expecting more from their new governments on the narcotics issue, and that the real test of the incoming Bush Administration in Washington will be the drug abuse budget they purpose to the Congress after they take office in January. The Secretary agreed with Mr. Hughes' comments and urged the delegation to keep an open, honest, and sincere dialogue with the Government and the people of Mexico.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARLOS SALINAS DE GORTARI

The highlight of the delegation's visit to Mexico was a successful meeting with newly inaugurated Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari.

President Salinas opened the meeting by stating that he had an "outstanding exchange" with President-elect Bush in Houston on the subject of drug trafficking and that he was informed that the delegation was having successful talks during its visit to Mexico City. The President underscored the need for continuing, positive dialogue with U.S. officials on drug control efforts. Mr. Salinas emphasized that combatting narco-trafficking will be his top concern as President of Mexico because he views it as a direct threat to the health and welfare of the Mexican people, as well as to the national security of Mexico. He vowed to expand the role of the military and the Attorney General in the fight against drug trafficking.

President Salinas stated his own personal commitment "to make life miserable for drug traffickers in Mexico, before they make life in Mexico miserable".

President Salinas stated that he is bringing in a new, yet, experienced team to direct Mexico's anti-drug effort, this is why, he explained, he picked the former Governor of Jalisco, Enrique Alvarez del Castillo, to be the Attorney General. Mr. Salinas stated that Alvarez had much experience as Governor in combating the drug trade.

The Mexican President outlined for the delegation the bold narcotics program that he has instructed his government to implement. These include the reorganization of the Office of the Attorney General with the establishment of a special narcotics enforcement division; stiffer criminal penalties for drug-related crimes and acts of public corruption; increased use of assets forfeiture and seizure laws against drug violators; and greater involvement of all elements of Mexican society in drug abuse prevention activities. President Salinas also stated, in a response to a question from Mr. Oxley, he would make appropriate requests for the swift conclusion of the prosecution of those charged with the murder and kidnap of DEA Agent Enrique Camarena and his pilot Alfredo Zavala Avelar.

President Salinas told the delegation that he views drug trafficking as a threat to democracy throughout the Western Hemisphere and that the organized criminal groups that are in control of the traffic have the capability of corrupting everywhere. He indicated he was ready to join with the United States to do what is necessary to overcome the drug problem, and said "whatever you do in the United States, I will do my job in Mexico".

The President concluded his remarks by offering "two ideas" to the delegation. He suggested first, that the United States and Mexico continue the dialogue and communication on narcotics control in good faith, and second, that both the U.S. and Mexico resist pressure from extreme elements in their countries to "bash" each other over the drug issue.

Mr. Rangel, in response, stated that he, and the members of the delegation were genuinely impressed by the President's commitment to the drug effort, and that after the candid exchange with Mr. Salinas that "we came as friends, but leave as partners". The Chairman noted that the Select Committee's visit to Mexico will no doubt open a new chapter in the historic friendship between the U.S. and Mexico.

The delegation also discussed the foreign debt, ecology and migrant worker issues with the President.

MEETINGS WITH MEXICAN LEGISLATORS

During its stay in Mexico City, the delegation conducted two meetings with representatives of the Mexican Senate and House of Representatives.

The delegation greeted Senator Emilio Gonzalez, President of the Senate, and a group of his colleagues. The members pledge to the Mexican legislators their resolve to work with them as fellow legislators on the problem of narcotics control. Chairman Rangel noted

his past satisfaction with the annual interparliamentary meetings with Mexican legislators and that how it serves as a useful forum to discuss the drug issue.

The delegation also participated in a joint meeting with the House Commission on Justice, chaired by Dep. Miguel Montes Garcia, and the House Commission on Foreign Relations, chaired by Dep. Guadalupe Gomez de Maganda. Approximately 40 Mexican representatives participated. This meeting was unique in that it included members of the opposition parties who won seats in the last election. The last election marked the most significant gains by the opposition in modern Mexican political history. Their participation in the Mexican Congress is expected to have a significant impact on Mexican policies, as well as relations with the U.S.

The Mexican representatives presented the delegation with a wide range of political viewpoints on a number of issues in addition to narcotics control. These included: trade, immigration, economic development, border relations, and social issues.

The delegation listened with interest to the remarks of the Mexican representatives and commented on the need for legislators to work together and resolve differences, and not allow drug trafficking problems "to come between friends" and cause pain on either country. The members told their counterparts of the need to confine discussions to an atmosphere of friendship and mutual respect. They emphasized the need to build on the goodwill of the Salinas-Bush meeting and the work of the U.S.-Mexico Interparliamentary Conference.

MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER FERNANDO SOLANA MORALAS

On Saturday morning, December 10, the delegation met with the new Mexican Foreign Minister, Fernando Solana Moralas. Mr. Solana welcomed the delegation by stating he appreciated the request to meet with the members so that discussions could begin with American officials "at the very beginning of our Administration." He expressed the view that two new governments taking over in Mexico City and Washington offered great possibilities for solutions to the narcotic control problem.

The Foreign Minister emphasized that Mexico and the U.S. need to establish "mechanisms of cooperation" that emphasize communications, and not recriminations. Mr. Solana underscored that the drug problem is an international problem, and not one of "producer countries or consumer countries." He offered the suggestion that Mexico and the U.S. identify problem areas and possible solutions in the narcotics control effort and concentrate on them. Addressing the issue of U.S. certification of drug source countries, the Minister stated that no country has a right to sit in judgment on another, but what needs to be done is to identify problems and act on them for the good of our people. Mr. Guarini concurred in a closing statement on behalf of the delegation and stated that "we need to find common solutions to our problems."

MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER LT. GEN. ANTONIO RIVIELLO BAZAN

The delegations' last official visit in Mexico City was to the Defense Ministry and a brief call on the new Defense Minister, Lt.

Gen. Antonio Riviello Bazan. The General, in greeting the delegation stated that he shares President Salinas' belief that drug trafficking is a threat to the national security of Mexico and to the health of the youth of Mexico. He pledged to work under President Salinas' direction to rid his nation of this menace.

The delegation was then led on a tour of the narcotics unit of the Mexican Armed Forces. The tour included an inspection of irrigation equipment, packing machines, and other farming tools used in the cultivation and processing of marijuana and opium. The tour also included an examination of weapons used by the drug traffickers, smuggling devices, and drug paraphernalia. The articles on display were all seized in drug operations conducted by the Armed Forces.

At the conclusion of the tour, the delegation was given a briefing on the marijuana and poppy eradication program conducted by the Armed Forces. The briefing reviewed eradication statistics and enforcement operations against trafficking routes. The members raised the issue of the accuracy of the eradication figures in light of the fact that the total amount of marijuana and opium production in Mexico is unknown. The defense officials conceded this point and indicated they make their best estimate by a process of extrapolation from amounts eradicated and seized.

STAFF MEETING WITH OFFICIALS FROM BELL HELICOPTER

A GAO report issued in January, 1988, was highly critical of the U.S./Mexico opium poppy and marijuana aerial eradication program. The report found that management inefficiencies, in particular the spare parts procurement program, prevent the air fleet from operating at full capacity, thereby limiting eradication. In June 1988, the office of the Mexican Attorney General (PGR) and Bell helicopters signed a USG funded contract to provide aviation maintenance and procurement services in support of the PGR air fleet.

According to the State Department, the new contract contains very specific language as to who is responsible for what functions. The PGR, with the assistance of Bell personnel, is responsible for determining spare parts requirements; Bell is responsible for the procurement of the parts; and the PGR is responsible for the distribution of the parts. Bell is also responsible for training PGR mechanics and will have 34 technicians on site in Mexico.

John W. Cronin, General Manager of Bell Helicopter Services Inc. (a subsidiary of Bell Textron, Inc.) told staff that when Bell came in on June 13, 1988 they found severe management problems with the program. He reported serious shortages in spare parts; which, because of the need to order from the U.S., led to long delays in repairs. Bell personnel completed a review of the spare parts situation and are in the process of computerizing their operation to increase efficiency.

The availability rate of aircraft is up to 75 percent under Bell. It was reported that six months ago availability was 65 percent. Eradication operations place great strain on aircraft because of the need to fly low to the ground and at slow speeds while spraying. The high altitude of Mexico, as well as the high temperatures, in-

creasing production in mountainous regions, and incidents of automatic weapons being fired at the aircraft, place additional stress on the aircraft and further complicate the eradication mission.

Staff asked about the reliability of the Mexican personnel trained and assisted by Bell. It was reported that the low salaries has led some Mexican pilots and mechanics to seek second jobs. There is also still a problem with the communication and navigation equipment being out of date. Spare parts are impossible to obtain for approximatelly 50 percent of the equipment which is obsolete. When asked directly about corruption, Mr. Cronin responded that the problem with some of the Mexicans working in the program is lack of effort, not corruption. Bell expects that their contract with the Mexican Government will be extended another year.

PGR Aircraft Fleet

The fleet maintained by the PGR Air Services consists of the following aircraft:

BELL 206B III HELICOPTERS; AUTHORIZED 58

N1077S	XC-HET	XC-FAG
N39086	XC-HIJ*	XC-FIX
N4430T	XC-HIO*	XC-HAT
XC-BUI	XC-HFC	XC-HIG*
XC-DAO	N16921	XC-HIL*
XC-FET	N3908B	XC-HIQ*
XC-GIQ	N5004U	XC-HFE
XC-HES	XC-COF	N39081
XC-HII*	XC-DAS	N3908G
XC-HIN*	XC-FIP	XC-BON
XC-HIZ	XC-HAI	XC-COR
XC-HFG	XC-HIF*	XC-FAJ
N1081C	XC-HIK*	XC-FON
N39089	XC-HIP*	XC-HER
N5001L	XC-HFD	XC-HIH*
XC-BUL	N322SK	XC-HIM*
XC-DAP	N3908E	XC-HIR
XC-FEU	XC-BOM	XC-HFF
XC-HAG	XC-COO	

Aircraft followed by an (*) are not included under the Agreement.
Total 206: 56, plus two aircraft pending acquisition.

BELL 212/UH1-N HELICOPTERS; AUTHORIZED 14

XC-BAT	XC-GUG
XC-GAB	XC-BEJ
XC-GIF	XC-HEV
XC-BEB	XC-BEV
XC-GAC	XC-GIE
XC-BEI	

Total 212/UH1-N; 11, plus three aircraft pending acquisition.

CESSNA 206/210 AIRPLANES; AUTHORIZED 28

N9413Z	XB-AWY	XC-DEO
N9987Z	N9913Z	XB-DST
XC-CEB	XC-CAV	N9973Z
XC-DEL	XC-CEM	XC-CAY
XC-HEZ	XC-DEN	XC-DEK
N9898Z	XB-CZH	XC-DEP
XC-CAT	N9963Z	XB-DTG
XC-CEG	XC-CAX	
XC-DEM	XC-DEI	

Total Cessna 206/210: 25, plus three pending approval.

OTHER FIXED WING AIRCRAFT; AUTHORIZED 6

DeHavilland DHC-6s	XC-BOS	XC-DIO
Beechcraft A200	XC-DIJ	N68KA
Lear Jet 35A	XC-PGR*	XC-FIT

Aircraft followed by an (*) are not included under the Agreement.
Total other fixed wing: 6.
Total existing PGR Fleet: 98.
Total aircraft covered under the agreement: 85.
Total aircraft authorized under the agreement: 93.
Total PGR Fleet authorized: 106.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The delegation salutes the new spirit of cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking launched by President Salinas and President-elect Bush in November in Houston, Texas. The continued commitment of both new governments to an effective U.S.-Mexican anti-narcotics effort is essential to its ultimate success.

2. The delegation enthusiastically received President Salinas' statement that, "he would make life miserable for drug traffickers in Mexico because they made life in Mexico miserable". The delegation urges the new Bush Administration and the State Department to foster an activist role by President Salinas, not only in his country, but throughout the Western Hemisphere. In this regard, the U.S. should encourage a large role for Mexico in the proposed Western Hemisphere Drug Conference as called for in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.

3. The delegation was encouraged by the commitment of both President Salinas and Attorney General Alvarez to the reorganization of the PGR to make it more effective in the fight against drug trafficking. The delegation encourages the State Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration to work with Attorney General Alvarez in any manner he requests to assist in this reorganization. The delegation hopes that this reorganization will enhance intelligence and information sharing, and improved coordination between DEA and Mexican enforcement officials.

4. The delegation is concerned about DEA's termination of Operation Vanguard, the joint eradication verification program with the Mexican Government. The delegation understands that a new verification program is under examination by DEA and the State Department. The delegation urges that a new verification system be put in place in Mexico as soon as possible. An accurate accounting of Mexican eradication efforts is essential to the overall program, and to U.S.-Mexican cooperation.

5. The delegation urges both the Salinas and Bush Administrations to explore how enhanced drug enforcement operations can be conducted jointly along the Mexican border.

6. The delegation enjoyed its exchanges with members of the Mexican Senate and House of Representatives, and looks forward to future discussions at the annual Mexico-U.S. Interparliamentary Conferences. Narcotics control discussions have become an integral part of these annual events and should remain a top priority of the Conference.

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BELIZE

(DEC. 11, 1988)

Background

Belize's warm climate and large areas of sparsely populated and lightly policed terrain have made it a logical location for year round marijuana production. The country's geographic location make it easily accessible by air, sea, and land to the United States. Thus Belize could potentially become a major exporter of marijuana to the U.S.; it already is a significant transshipment point.

Total U.S. military and economic assistance to Belize was $7.690 million in FY 1988, including an estimated $220,000 from the Agency for International Development (AID) for an anti-narcotics program. However, Economic Support Funds (ESF) were zeroed out in 1988. The Administration has requested $10.2 million for FY 1989, including $2.0 million for ESF, and $212,000 for AID funding.

The Belizean National Police (BNP) have less than 500 officers to police an area larger than Massachusetts. The Belizean Defense Forces (BDF), which number just over 700 men, have been assisting in the anti-narcotic effort. The air wing has only two planes and maritime resources are extremely limited.

The Belizeans have had a longstanding territorial dispute with Guatemala. There are 1,500 British troops based in Belize to patrol the border. Recent negotiations between Guatemala and Belize in Florida have yet to resolve the border dispute.

Belize has a population of about 200,000. Thus their tax base is small and the salaries of police and armed forces personnel are low, thereby increasing the danger of corruption.

In recent years the United States has reduced the sugar quota for Belize because of increased American self-sufficiency. Many sugar cane farmers were hurt and some probably moved into marijuana production. The Caribbean Basin Initiative program (CBI) has helped offset the impact of the lower quotas, but a net improvement from CBI has yet to materialize.

BRIEFINGS AND MEETINGS

Embassy briefing:

Amb. Robert Rich and his staff, virtually all of whom are involved in the anti-narcotics effort, briefed the Codel on the narcotics situation in Belize. The Ambassador reported that Belize is faced with only one short-term threat and that is the narcotics threat posed by the Central American drug syndicates. The U.S. has a four part program to directly combat drugs and an economic support program which is designed to strengthen the Belizean economy so that it can better resist the narco-traffickers. The four-part plan includes eradication, enforcement, interdiction, and education.

Eradication:

In FY '87 the State Department contributed $900,000 in INM funds to the Belizean eradication effort. The Belizean personnel for the program is provided by the Belizean Defense Force (BDF) and

the Belizean National Police (BNP). Seven months of herbicidal spraying were conducted in both 1987 and 1988. As a result of spraying, marijuana cultivation has decreased significantly, from about 3,000 hectares in 1986 to about 1,000 hectares in 1987.

Enforcement:

The eradication program has effectively limited marijuana production, but drug traffickers are attempting to use established marijuana trafficking routes in Belize to smuggle cocaine into the U.S. In order to combat this threat, the Government of Belize, with British and American assistance, has established within the BNP the Serious Crime Squad (SCG).

The SCG also provides a professional anti-narcotics unit which the DEA can work with in handling Belizean cases. The DEA office in Guatemala City is responsible for drug trafficking operations in Belize, where one agent has continuing responsibility for Belizean cases. The Ambassador reported that cooperation and coordination with the Guatemala City office is effective and that there is no immediate need for a DEA agent to be permanently stationed in Belize.

Interdiction:

Belize has a 170-mile coastline on the Caribbean immediately South of the Yucatan Channel. It is not difficult for small boats to transfer their illicit drugs to larger vessels. Belize has only two aircraft and very limited maritime capability to combat this trafficking.

In August 1988 a anti-narcotics agreement was signed between the U.S. Government and the Government of Belize. The U.S. would provide $190,000 in State Department INM funds for equipment, training and operational support. In return the GOB would combine the BDF and BNP assets for combined operations. In September a U.S. Coast Guard mobile training team conducted a course in Belize on maritime law enforcement for BNP, BDF, and customs personnel.

Drug education:

The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) funds a drug education program conducted by PRIDE Inc. (Parent's Resource Institute for Drug Education, Inc.). Since 1985, $750,000 has been devoted to this program. The program's major goals include the incorporation of drug education curricula in all schools, the creation of youth action groups, cooperation with and support for the Belize National Drug Awareness Council, and the establishment of 27 small resource centers throughout Belize where drug information could be continually available.

Economic development:

Efforts by the U.S. Government to enhance economic development in Belize impacts significantly on the drug issue. The AID economic program has three chief objectives: 1) To achieve economic stability, 2) to help create sustained economic growth through broadening the economic base, and 3) to help spread the benefits of economic growth to the majority of the population.

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MANUEL ESQUIVEL, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER CURL THOMPSON, AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEAN BARROW

After introductions by the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister Thompson, who is also Minister of Home Affairs, told the delegation that Belize's narcotics problem is under control. Domestic marijuana production has been significantly reduced, but it remains difficult to contain trafficking through Belize of marijuana and cocaine. However, Mr. Thompson warned that if the government did not remain vigilant, marijuana production would immediately re-emerge on large scale.

Belize's narcotics problem as well as drug-related crime, violence, and corruption has worsened as the transshipment of Andean cocaine through the country has increased. Catching cocaine traffickers, because of the smaller volumes involved, has proved difficult. The Belizean forces have begun to utilize a canine force to help in the drug detection effort.

Prime Minister Esquivel expressed concern that the radar network which the United States is developing in the Caribbean will leave a hole over Belize, sending drug traffic its way. Interest was expressed in acquiring and setting up a radar surveillance capability in Belize. The Belizean Government expressed the desire for U.S. technical assistance in this effort, but insisted that the facilities, once operational, should be run by Belizeans.

The possibility of a Tax Exchange Treaty between the U.S. and Belize was brought up by Chairman Rangel. Such a treaty would enable both governments to better track the transfer of funds in order to combat money laundering.

Congressman Crockett encouraged the Belizean Government to maintain regular contact with Members of Congress. Mr. Crockett also reported that he would reintroduce legislation on a Regional Development Bank for the Caribbean in the next Congress.

When asked by Congressman Fauntroy what else the U.S. might do to assist Belize, the Belizean Ministers stated strongly that their country needed assistance to develop its infrastructure. They would also appreciate consistent MAP funds to support an expansion of their small maritime fleet.

The need for a larger drug education program was also mentioned. The Pride drug awareness program is continuing, but churches and schools should do more to teach people the dangers of drugs. The ministers expressed concern over the introduction of crack into their country.

When asked about a hemispheric drug summit, the Foreign Minister responded that Belize has made it clear that it favors international cooperation at the highest levels. The Prime Minister reported that he has discussed with President Salinas of Mexico the sharing of intelligence information between their two countries and the possibility of establishing a radar surveillance network along Belize's northern border with Mexico.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) Belize requires continued training and assistance in law enforcement, interdiction, and surveillance as well as continued eco-

nomic assistance. An effort should be made to stabilize this support so that programs can be efficiently planned and implemented. Modest levels of ESF and MAP support should continue: $500,000 has been requested for MAP for FY 1989.

(2) The anti-drug surveillance network being developed by the U.S. in the Caribbean should not leave a gap over Belize. We should work with Belize in helping to establish needed facilities to insure that traffickers do not use Belize as an "uncovered" spot in the Caribbean to smuggle narcotics.

(3) Mexico and Belize should develop an intelligence sharing program, including a jointly operated radar system.

(4) Belize, for economic reasons, is interested in developing tourism in isolated regions of its country. However, government officials are concerned that drug traffickers will exploit any development to expand their trafficking operations. To prevent this occurence, good law enforcement, with U.S. assistance, must be maintained.

(5) The U.S.G. should do all that it can to encourage investment in Belize in order to limit the temptation for that nation to become involved in drug production or trafficking.

JAMAICA

EMBASSY BRIEFING

On Monday, December 12, 1988, the delegation was briefed by Ambassador Michael Sotirhos, Deputy Chief of Mission Stephen Gibson, Political Counselor James Nach, DEA Country Attaché James Williams, Defense Attaché Lt. Col. Michael Lowe, USAID Director William Joslin, and Military Liaison Officer Lt. Col. Samuel Smith.

The Embassy was pleased to report the excellent efforts made in the last few years by the Jamaican Government to eliminate the production and flow of narcotics in and through Jamaica.

They said that the enthusiasm and commitment to the drug enforcement efforts had evolved only in recent years. Traditionally, there has been a cultural acceptance of the cultivation and personal use of modest amounts of marijuana. In addition, some small farmers would grow little plots of marijuana to supplement their otherwise insufficient incomes. By the mid-1980's, drug traffickers, who either had been pushed out of other countries or who were just looking to expand, targeted the fertile lands of Jamaica for extensive cultivation of marijuana.

By 1985, there were 5,000 acres of marijuana under cultivation. By 1986, the amount had increased to 11,000 acres. The production was so blatant, you could see it from the highways. The government and people of Jamaica felt they were being used and committed themselves to fighting the production of drugs. Both political parties came out strongly opposing the use of Jamaica by drug barons for their heinous criminal activities. In 1985, 2,000 acres of marijuana were eradicated. In 1986, when production reached over 11,000 acres, eradication increased to over 5,000 acres.

The Jamaican Government had sent a serious message to drug traffickers. As a result of these very successful campaigns in 1985

and 1986, production dropped in 1987 to 3,200 acres and the government eradicated about 75% of that crop.

The successful eradication campaigns were carried out primarily by the Jamaican Defense Force (JDF) with the assistance of the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF). They were to a large extent financed by INM (State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters) program funds.

INM funding increased from $400,000 in 1985 to $1.5 million in 1986 and peaked at $3.4 million in 1987. In 1988, it dropped to $2 million, and for 1989, it is expected to drop to $1 million. The Ambassador urged the delegation to take the message back to Washington that in order to maintain a successful eradication program, the excellent work by the JDF and JCF needed adequate, consistent funding. He pointed out that the eradication campaign in Jamaica was one of the few successful campaigns throughout the world, and that showing our appreciation by cutting funds would most certainly send the wrong message.

While acreage has dropped, cultivation has been in more remote, smaller, less easy to detect plots, which are scattered throughout Jamaica. Reconnaissance and eradication, therefore, are becoming more difficult and more time consuming. More resources, training and manpower will be needed.

While an earlier request for helicopters for the eradication campaign had been declined, a recent request for 4 helicopters to be used in the hurricane disaster relief has been granted. Four Bell helicopters will be lent to the Jamaican Government for 9 months at no charge. They hope to be able to renew this agreement.

The government of Jamaica is also making efforts to curtail the use of its air and seaports for the transshipment of cocaine into and through Jamaica. A new task force has been created among Customs and law enforcement agencies to check air and maritime shipping containers for illegal cargo. The Contraband Enforcement Team (CET) as it is called, has received equipment and training from the U.S. In addition, the U.S. has provided radar to assist the government track airplanes flying in Jamaican airspace without a registered flight plan.

There has been continuing progress in identifying and destroying illegal airstrips. There were over 80 illegal strips in the heyday of marijuana cultivation. Now, the cocaine traffickers are utilizing the existing smuggling network.

The successes in narcotics control have occurred simultaneously with a warming of relations between Jamaica and the U.S. In the 1970's when the People's National Party (PNP) had been in power, Jamaica was much closer to Cuba than to the U.S. When Prime Minister Edward Seaga of the Jamaican Labor Party (JLP) was voted into office in 1980, he removed the Cuban Embassy.

By the mid-1980's, the PNP had changed its confrontational policy vis a vis the U.S., accepting the friendship and support of the U.S. Whether or not this change in relations is permanent remains to be seen.

The Prime Minister of Jamaica must call elections within 5 years following the last election. The most recent election was held in January 1984. It was scheduled following the euphoria of the Grenada victory, and because of this obviously political timing, was

boycotted by the PNP. As a result, the JLP got all 60 seats in the Parliament, controlling the entire government. This total power was a real test of Jamaica's commitment to democracy. The PNP was neither destroyed nor abused, proving a deep-rooted sense of democracy in Jamaica.

The tragedy of Hurricane Gilbert has cemented the close and friendly relationship between Jamaica and the U.S.

Thirty million dollars in U.S. P.L. 480 funds (originally designed to combat hunger) were accelerated for disaster relief.

The U.S. provided $40 million in housing guarantees.

There were $20 million in unexpended AID funds that were targeted to be distributed in the Caribbean, but as a result of the hurricane, were programmed entirely for the disaster relief effort in Jamaica.

There was a $35 million grant from Congress, $5 million of which was to be used for the restoration of electrical power in Jamaica.

For FY 1989, $25 million in ESF funds were earmarked for Jamaica, as were $3.5 million in MAP funds. Both had been zero funded in FY 1988.

The outpouring of assistance from the American public was impressive. Over 2 million pounds of relief supplies had been donated in the U.S. to Jamaica. U.S. dock workers waived their fees on shipments for disaster relief.

The Jamaican economy had been on a good track before the hurricane with an annual growth rate of 5%. After the hurricane, the estimate for 1989 has dropped to 3%. Jamaica still has a large foreign debt, over $4 billion.

Unemployment is still high, but is decreasing. The government of Jamaica has entered into agreements with Kaiser Aluminum and a Norwegian firm to mine bauxite which could mean as many as 1,000 new jobs will be created.

Recent tax reform legislation was designed to increase productivity. Previously there had been a threshold of $1000. Anyone earning above that was taxed at 57% for the entire amount of income. Under the new law, the threshold is much higher and only the income above it is taxed, at the rate of 33%.

The garment industry is another area of growth. Clothing is sewn in Jamaica from fabrics cut and manufactured in the U.S., and of U.S. design.

Overall, the Embassy is optimistic about the future of the Jamaican economy.

After the briefing, the delegation left by JDF helicopter for a briefing at their training camp in Moneague.

JDF–JCF BRIEFING ON MARIJUANA ERADICATION, MONEAGUE TRAINING CAMP NEAR KINGSTON, JAMAICA—DECEMBER 12, 1988

Cooperation between the military and the Federal policy in marijuana eradicational efforts has been effective in impacting the cultivation of ganja marijuana in Jamaica, members of the delegation were told in an official briefing at the Jamaica Defense Force's Moneague training camp. Presentations by the Jamaican Minister of National Security and officials representing the Jamaican De-

fense Force and the Jamaican Constabulary Force (police) exemplified to the members of the delegation the way in which cooperative military involvement in the war on drugs can be a successful strategy in combating drug trafficking.

Members were told during the briefing that Jamaica's drug problem remains one of the island nation being used as a transshipment point, as well as its being used as a cultivation hotbed for ganja. Largely in response to the ganja cultivation, the Jamaican Defense Force and the Jamaican Constabulary Force have combined to forge a partnership called Operation Buccaneer. Jamaican officials, in their briefing, updated the members with data from the latest phase of Operation Buccaneer, which ended for the time being earlier this year. In addition, members were provided a live demonstration of crop eradication and suspect apprehension techniques, compliments of Moneague Camp infantrymen, who ran through the various spraying, burning and cutting team drills that make up the Operation Buccaneer repertoire.

Jamaican officials credit Operation Buccaneer with severely impacting the island's marijuana cultivation. During the briefing, members were told that Operation Buccaneer wiped out about 75% of the ganja crop during the 1987 period, and virtually all of the local marijuana industry during phase four, which went from the fall of 1987 until the spring of 1988. In addition, the Jamaican officials told the delegation that about 90% of the illegal airstrips in Jamaica had been destroyed as part of the Operation Buccaneer Eradication Program. The last phase of Operation Buccaneer was credited with the eradication of more than 4,000 acres of marijuana, the spraying of another 57 acres, the capturing and burning of 116,895 pounds and the seizure of many weapons used in the drug trade. Both the defense force and the constabulary force remain close working partners post-Buccaneer. Since Buccaneer ended in March 1988, the defense and constabulary forces have eradicated more than 600 acres of marijuana and have captured and burned more than 40,000 pounds between them.

The members were also briefed about the way Operation Buccaneer was put together. The active personnel was comprised of JCF Narcotics Team members, JDF mobil reserve personnel, about 120 civilian laborers and JDF air support. Funding by the U.S. was instrumental in the purchase of helicopters for the eradication project. Eradication operations were targeted very specifically, with a total of seven "main growing areas" mapped out for the active eradication.

While Operation Buccaneer was the major item on the agenda during the briefing at the JDF Moneague Camp, members were also filled in as to the status of the drug problem overall in Jamaica. This information was delivered to the members of the delegation by Errol Anderson, Minister of National Security.

According to Minister Anderson, a new threat in Jamaica is the appearance of "pure" cocaine on the streets. Another threat is the increased usage of Jamaica as a transshipment point for cocaine directed at the United States, from South America. As Minister Anderson explained, Jamaica's almost central location between the U.S. and South America makes it easily accessible by light plane. Light planes often pointed out by Minister Anderson was the fact

that marijuana is being brought in to Jamaica from other countries, as a result of the successful eradication efforts in Jamaica that have made the crop more scarce.

The U.S. delegation was also told that about 20% of the police budget and 10% of the Jamaican Defense Force budget was appropriated for antidrug work. Among other drug control measures underway in Jamaica are a contraband enforcement team (CET) comprised of police and customs personnel, the increased use of dogs and a general tightening of airport security. In addition, Minister Anderson told the American delegation, legislation has been enacted in Jamaica to increase penalties for drug crimes through amending the Dangerous Drug Act, and drug offenses have been removed from the local courts to the higher-level courts for trial. Jamaica has also targeted large-scale dealers, and Minister Anderson announced at the briefing that three so-called "drug barons" had been identified and brought to justice in Jamaica.

Jamaica is considering a host of new initiatives in the coming year that should have an effect on the nation's drug problem. Minister Anderson informed the American delegation that a national public awareness campaign is being planned, along with a sophisticated radar system that closely resembles the Dominican Republic's well-regarded Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC). Minister Anderson requested that the U.S. provide assistance in the radar installation. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's representative in Jamaica informed the delegation that a radar and information center was in the works for Jamaica, but would be some considerable time in its implementation, as Jamaica was considered to be the "last link" in the chain of radar-equipped Caribbean nations, a group that also would include Haiti and the Bahamas.

Finally, Minister Anderson pointed out that Jamaican authorities hoped to resolve the devastating problem of prison space; a problem that plagues Jamaica much in the same way the lack of prison space plagues the U.S. Finding more room for offenders will allow a more favorable climate for serious penalties to be rendered against drug violators. At some point in the near future, Jamaica also hopes to be able to conduct large-scale financial investigations that could conceivably lead the authorities to the doorsteps of drug dealers.

Overall, Jamaicans are concerned that unless anti-drug efforts (such as Operation Buccaneer) are first maintained and then stepped up, the island paradise nation will receive a severe threat to its sovereignty and the welfare of all its citizens.

VISIT TO ERADICATION SITES

The delegation proceeded by helicopter to an eradication site in the center of the island. From the air one could see smoke coming from the side of a hill, the actual source of the smoke obscured by trees. The actual plot of marijuana was smaller than an acre. Adjacent to it were small plots of sweet potato, cabbage, yams, and patches of corn, designed to conceal the illicit marijuana crop. Workers were cutting down the plant and piling them on either of 2 raging bonfires to ensure their destruction.

The delegation was impressed with the hard work and commitment of the Jamaican eradication workers.

The delegation visited another similar eradication site in the lowlands on southwestern part of the island. Enroute by helicopter, the delegation spotted an illegal landing strip perpendicular to the remains of a landing strip that had been destroyed.

JAMAICAN GOVERNMENT BRIEFING ON HURRICANE GILBERT

The delegation was briefed by Commander John McFarlane, Director of Disaster Preparedness, and the Honorable (Dr.) Marco Brown, Minister of State for Tourism.

Hurricane Gilbert struck Jamaica on September 12, 1988, affecting the entire length of the island. Winds up to 140 mph, flash floods, and mudslides killed 49 people and left 800,000 homeless.

The damage was described as being two-fold: the physical damage on the one hand, such as buildings, roads, trees, power lines and the communications system, and on the other hand, the damage to the people—accompanying the loss of life and injuries were loss of income, a sense of helplessness, hopelessness and sorrow. Hampering the recuperation process was the serious damage to medical clinics and hospitals, with over 50% of these facilities affected.

Fortunately, the delegation was told, the people responded to the disaster with new strength and a commitment to rebuilding their nation.

The disaster relief effort involves private volunteer organizations as well as government-to-government assistance, both coming from all over the world. An average of 1–2 aircraft per week still arrive in Jamaica with supplies and equipment. Significantly, the technical infrastructure in Jamaica is being greatly improved as a result. New state of the art communications equipment, power lines, and other sophisticated computer equipment are being brought on line.

Dr. Marco Brown, Minister of State for Tourism, informed the delegation that every single hotel in Jamaica was damaged in some way. Six of the major hotels sustained severe damage. Two of those have not yet reopened. There was an estimated total of $15 million in structural damages.

The Minister was proud to report that the Jamaican people were eager to do whatever necessary to repair the damages and get the Jamaican economy back on its feet. The hotel where the briefing was held, Sandels Hotel in Montego Bay, was one of the more severely damaged, in one of the hardest hit areas of the island. Two hundred of the hotel's staff of 400 reported to work the day after the hurricane struck.

Unfortunately, the island does not have sufficient materials to rebuild immediately. Lumber, concrete and other building materials must be imported. This has slowed down reconstruction considerably.

A group of the delegation then overflew some of the hardest hit areas of the island. Groves of trees had been uprooted; houses, schools, churches, hotels, hospitals and other edifices were viewed in various stages of destruction and repair. For some of the smaller

dwellings, all that remained was the foundation. Other buildings either had no roofs or partial roofs.

The helicopters landed for an inspection of the Happy Grove school site where 52 U.S. troops from the Alabama and Iowa Air National Guard were assisting in rebuilding the local high school and church.

PRIME MINISTER EDWARD SEAGA

The day's activities culminated with a reception and dinner hosted by Prime Minister Seaga. The Prime Minister expressed his sincere commitment to waging war against the drug traffickers who use Jamaica for the cultivation of ganja, as well as a transshipment point for cocaine destined for the U.S. He also expressed his deep gratitude to the United States Congress for their assistance in earmarking funds to Jamaica for disaster recovery programs.

The delegation, in return, expressed its favorable impression of the commitment and dedication of the Jamaican government in the effort against narcotics trafficking which so tragically affects the democracies of the Western Hemisphere. The meeting also afforded the delegation an opportunity to share the sorrow at the losses incurred by the Jamaican people as a result of Hurricane Gilbert. They encouraged the Jamaican people to use this time of trial to build a stronger Jamaica, and to create a lasting bond of friendship with the United States.

JAMAICA—RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The eradication efforts in Jamaica have been impressively successful. However, the government will need to maintain the pressure against drug producers. State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) has cut its narcotics assistance to Jamaica from $3.4 million in 1987 to $2 million in 1988, and it is expected to decrease even further to $1 million in 1989. The delegation urges INM to maintain funding at least at the 1988 level to ensure that Jamaica has the wherewithal to continue its successful efforts.

2. While an earlier request for helicopters to be used in eradication missions had been denied, four Bell helicopters are on loan to Jamaica for 9 months for hurricane disaster relief. The delegation recommends that when the disaster relief mission is completed, the helicopter loan agreement be extended, so that they may be redeployed for the marijuana eradication campaign.

3. Jamaica is increasingly being used as a cocaine transit point. The delegation urges DEA, Customs and Coast Guard to provide the needed and requested assistance to their Jamaican counterparts in their attempts to halt the flow of cocaine. A top priority should be assisting Jamaica set up an intelligence coordination center, much like the successful Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC) in the Dominican Republic.

4. The Jamaican Minister of National Security and other Jamaican officials indicated an interest in learning more about conducting large-scale financial investigations that would lead to the arrest and conviction of the drug bosses. The delegation is encour-

aged by their interest and encourages DEA and U.S. Department of Justice to offer assistance and training to the Minister of National Security.

HAVANA, CUBA

DECEMBER 13, 1988

The objective of the delegation's visit to Cuba was to ascertain whether there were any ways in which Cuba and the United States could cooperate on narcotics matters. The hope was that narcotics trafficking could be treated similarly to search and rescue operations where nations cooperate despite political differences because of the life threatening nature of the problem.

In January 1961, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Cuba. Since that time U.S.-Cuban relations have been characterized by varying degrees of hostility. During the Administration of President Jimmy Carter, Interests Section were established. In Havana, a U.S. Interests Section was established in the Swiss Embassy. A Cuban Interests Section was established in the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington, D.C.

At the present time, the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba is directed by John J. Taylor, Principal Officer. On their arrival in Havana Mr. Taylor met with the delegation at the Interests Section.

The narcotics control function within the Cuban Government is carried out by the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Public Health. The Revolutionary Armed Forces apparently also play a role in the apprehension of suspected traffickers. No public information is available on how these organizations cooperate, on their lines of authority and on their areas of responsibility.

Internally, sanctions for drug trafficking and possession are severe. The Cuban Penal Code provides for imprisonment of three to eight years for the production; transport; trafficking; and possession, with intent to traffic or to procure for others, of toxic drugs, hallucinogens, hypnotics, or narcotics substances. Simple possession is also punishable by a sentence of imprisonment.

Efforts are made to suppress drug smuggling. In most instances, the arrest of foreign drug smugglers involves marijuana traffickers in smaller vessels who develop engine or navigational problems while passing through the Windward Passage to the east of Cuba. International traffickers fly over Cuban airspace and in several cases have been apprehended, when these planes develop mechanical difficulties and are forced to land in Cuba.

An estimated 18 American citizens are in Cuban prisons on drug-related charges. Approximately one dozen Cuban-Americans are in prison on drug-related charges.

No reliable detailed information is available on government activity against drug cultivation. A May 1987 article in *Moncada*, the monthly journal of the Cuban Ministry of Interior, reported that "between October 1980 and March 1986 Cuban authorities captured 63 boats and 20 planes while they were transporting drugs to the U.S. They seized 350 tons of marijuana, one ton of cocaine, 73,300 quaaludes and 174,000 dilaudid (pills). A total of 328 drug traffickers were arrested and prosecuted." There is, however, no independent confirmation of this assertion.

The Cuban Government has repeatedly denied any Cuban involvement in drug trafficking activities. The Cuban Government has noted that it has arrested and imprisoned a number of persons, including U.S. citizens for engaging in narcotics trafficking in Cuban territorial waters. An indictment against Panamanian Manuel Noriega, handed down in the U.S. in February 1988, asserted that Fidel Castro had mediated a drug-related dispute between Noriega and top Colombian drug traffickers. In Miami, a federal grand jury returned an indictment which included charges that on two occasions in 1982, a plane unloaded cocaine at a Cuban airfield for shipment by boat to the United States.

There is no available evidence on the extent of drug abuse in Cuba. There does not, however, appear to be a serious consumption problem.

VISIT TO CUBAN HIGH SCHOOL AND ORTHOPEDIC HOSPITAL

The Cuban Minister of Education and Vice President of the Council of Ministers, Jose Fernandez, escorted the delegation to a senior high school in the countryside where the group was addressed by the school principal and given a tour of the facility. The school was a boarding school for city children and children from the surrounding area.

The school program combined study and work in the citrus fields in order to instill the work ethic. The delegation was told that the students spend five hours in the classroom each day, studying such subjects as: mathematics, biology, physics, chemistry, English, Russian, Marxism-Leninism, physical education, computers and early military training. Three and a half hours are spent in the fields. There are 636 students in the school. Half go to the fields in the morning and have classes in the afternoon; half go to school in the morning and to the fields in the afternoon. In addition to their classroom and field assignments, students engage in recreational, sports, cultural and vocational activities. There are currently 650 similar senior high schools in Cuba. These have been developed since 1971.

The Cuban school system has 3 levels: pre and primary school—to grade 6, middle school—from grades 7 to 9, senior high school—10 to 12th grade. The student population includes 1 million primary school students, 12.2 middle school students, and 300,000 senior high school students. The explanation given for the large middle school population was that 14 to 18 years ago there had been a baby boom in Cuba. Education costs and related costs are paid by the state.

The delegation was also taken to a 637 bed hospital, specializing in orthopedic medicine—diagnosis, treatment and research. Dr. Rodrigo Alvarez Cambra, the director of the hospital, gave the orientation.

Patients are sent to the hosptial for orthopedic conditions requiring special treatment. They are referred to this facility through the national orthopedic system or they come from the immediate neighborhood and surrounding areas (only 5 percent of patients). The selection of patients is done to make the most profitable" use of resources, since the cost of care at this facility is extremely ex-

pensive. The facility includes a sports treatment unit for the treatment of patients with contagious bone or joint infections, outpatients facilities, a tissue bank, a laboratory, and an infectious disease hospital within the hospital. A hotel is being built on the grounds in order to house relatives of patients and those patients who need to be near the hospital for treatment but who do not need to be hospitalized.

Dr. Alvarez also provided a brief overview of the Cuban medical system. The family doctor program is the centerpiece. A doctor or doctor/nurse team working within a community is the focal point. The doctor has a house in the community—one floor for living quarters, one for the office, and a third floor if there is a nurse. The doctor knows the people in the community, including those with infections and diseases, as well as the pregnant women.

There are polytechnical hospitals that provide primary medical care. There are also numerous specialized hospitals for cardiology, oncology, hematology, immunology, and biogenetics, as well as the orthopedic hospital.

There are no drug treatment centers, because there is no serious drug problem in Cuba. The psychiatric hospital does provide detoxification. Most of these patients are foreigners; there are few Cubans.

There is no serious AIDS problem in Cuba. AIDS research is however, being conducted.

The new generation of Cuban doctors is trained in Cuba. When they go to foreign countries, they go to help, not for training, as had the older generation of doctors.

Doctors are the highest paid professionals in Cuba. Nurses are paid an adequate salary. Bonuses are given for scientific works and publications.

MEETING AT CUBAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE WITH MINISTER OF JUSTICE, JUAN ESCALONA, ATTORNEY GENERAL, RAMON DE LA CRUZ, AND DEPUTY MINISTER OF JUSTICE, AMADO JUNTIN

The primary focus of the meeting with members of the Cuban Ministry of Justice was the question of whether the Cuban government would consider some sort of international cooperative efforts in the arena of drug trafficking. Specifically, the delegation sought to explore with the Justice Minister and Attorney General, the possibility of the United States and Cuba beginning to talk about sharing information regarding drug trafficking.

Mr. Rangel explained to the Cubans that it was the hope of the delegation that with the advent of a new Administration in the White House, there would be a climate where the Cuban and U.S. Governments could talk again. He asserted that drug traffickers have no respect for any type of government and that while governments have disputes, drug traffickers do not. This fact has tragic costs. Because of these tragic costs, drug trafficking should be dealt with cooperatively, by governments, in the same way that they deal with life rescue missions.

The Minister of Justice indicated that while the Ministry was always willing to welcome people of good will, this was the first time they would be talking about drug trafficking. He asserted that

there was a permanent struggle against drug trafficking in the Caribbean and that the geographic location of Cuba made it impossible for her to elude drug trafficking.

The Minister informed the delegation that Cuba does act when ships or planes carrying illicit drugs enter Cuban territory or airspace, or when such planes land in Cuba when they are in trouble. He reported that 400 traffickers have been captured, mostly Colombians, then Americans, and other Latin Americans. Under the Cuban penal code, penalties for drug trafficking are severe—8 to 15 years in prison.

Minister Escalona pointed out that a number of drug traffickers from the United States have been delivered to different individuals including Jesse Jackson and a number of U.S. Senators. At present, there are just a few such prisoners.

In the past, according to the Minister, there were direct communications between Cuba and the U.S. Coast Guard and even joint operations, when the political climate was better. Describing the present climate, he specifically raised objections to Voice of America Radio Marti broadcasts and the possibility of a new Marti television station, indicating that this was an assault on Cuba.

With regard to the international dimensions of the drug problem, Minister Escalona discussed Cuba's participation in United Nations' efforts to reach an agreement on illegal drugs, during recent meetings scheduled to end on December 20, 1988. As Cuba is neither a drug producer or consumer nation, the Cuban Government perceives a possible role for itself as intermediary with the different countries in the subcontinent that are suffering from the tragedy, but that have different opinions as to what should be done. The Minister suggested that the fight against drugs should be from a common position and from a regional perspective. There should be shared responsibility between consumers and producers and not just punishment for producers. There should be shared responsibility, according to the Minister, because the bigger the market, the bigger the production.

Minister Escalona also indicated that the Cubans had been willing to applaud and sign as a declaration, Mrs. Nancy Reagan's U.N. speech on drugs in October in Mexico, but one month later in Vienna a very different position was adopted by the U.S. Administration. The Minister indicated that the Cubans were waiting to see what the new Administration would do.

Chairman Rangel pursued the issue of joint cooperation, asking the Minister what could be done jointly between Cuba and the United States on narcotics matters so that the delegation could make recommendations to the new Administration.

Minister Escalona indicated that the Cubans were conscious of what drugs mean, a scourge to humanity, and that they were willing to cooperate. They had a commission that was headed by the Justice Minister and included the Ministers of Health, Foreign Affairs, and Interior. He proposed that perhaps the way for Cuba to cooperate was through achieving an agreement at the United Nations.

Chairman Rangel again raised the issue that the drug problem should be treated by nations as they do search and rescue missions. The Minister asserted that Cubans would act in the right direc-

tion—confiscate drugs and take action against drug traffickers—because drugs were wrong for communism and capitalism. He suggested the Cubans were willing to cooperate with the U.S. Coast Guard. He, however, observed that Cuba had within it thorns and the amount of time allowed for the meeting with the U.S. delegation to discuss the drug issue and to resolve the issue of the role Cuba could play with the United States in the narcotics area was too short to reach a resolution. Moreover, he was only one minister in a government.

Chairman Rangel urged that Cuba place the narcotics issue on its non-political agenda. He asserted that this matter should be discussed in an atmosphere of mutual respect.

Ultimately, the Minister of Justice concluded that something could be done, and something had already been achieved—the fact that the meeting had been held, the narcotics issue talked about, and that the delegation carried with it the conviction that all Cuban officials are willing to do something about narcotics trafficking.

It was agreed that the narcotics problem was a matter open to discussions between the United States and Cuba.

MEETING WITH FIDEL CASTRO, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE OF CUBA

The entire delegation met with President Fidel Castro at the Palace of the Revolution. The focus of the meeting was to identify ways in which the United States and Cuban governments could work together to address the narcotics problem.

Setting the theme for the meeting, Mr. Rangel indicated that while the Congressional delegation was not in a position to make policy for the United States, the delegation wanted to raise the possibility of the United States and Cuba sharing views and information about narcotics trafficking. He suggested that this might include information about drug laden vessels coming in the direction of Cuba and aircraft carrying drugs flying over Cuba. If the Cubans could work with the United States on search and rescue efforts, why could they not do so in the narcotics area, since narcotics threatened all parts of society? The delegation sought to be able to go back to the United States with the possibility of sharing information and then try to persuade the new U.S. Administration, before it was locked firmly into a policy, to approach the Cuban Government on the narcotics problem as friends.

President Castro spoke of how the United States was improving relations with everyone, including the Soviet Union and China, except Cuba. He suggested Cuba was the "last enemy of the United States." He indicated, however, that he was open to the possibility of cooperation on the narcotics issue and pursued the discussion with the delegation for several hours.

Regarding the extent of the narcotics problem in the United States, President Castro inquired about the strategy used to respond to the problem; the scope of the crime problem in the United States, specifically drug-related crimes; the use of informants; the relationship between the drug problem, penalties for drug crimes, and the increasing prison population; the illegality of drug use in

the United States; whether drug abuse would disappear in the United States, if the supply of drugs were cut off; and the means of which drugs enter the United States.

The U.S. delegation responded to these inquiries. Members described the components of the 1986 and 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Acts—education; treatment; international efforts, directed toward providing crop substitution programs in producer countries; and interdiction. They explained the "user accountability" provisions in the 1988 legislation, which deny certain Federal benefits to those convicted of drug trafficking and use, although Chairman Rangel also indicated his opposition to such proposals.

President Castro was told of the proposal in the 1988 legislation that a Western Hemispheric Summit on narcotics be held. It was explained that the objective of such a summit would be to assess the threat of drug trafficking to the entire region and to ascertain whether the means of cooperation could be developed to deal with the threat. The most important outcome of such a summit would be for the nations of the hemisphere to unite to prevent the destruction of young people and to divert the energies of producers. This unified process would lay the groundwork for cooperation on other levels.

Statistics were provided on the extent of the drug problem in the United States: 600,000 heroin addicts, 25 million regular marijuana users, 30 million occasional cocaine users, and 6 to 8 million regular cocaine users. Members also discussed with President Castro the impact of the crack epidemic. In response to President Castro's questions about American prisons, Members indicated that there were: 42,000 Federal prisoners, a quarter of a million individuals sentenced to State facilities, and a quarter of a million persons in jail waiting trial.

In response to the question of whether drug abuse would disappear in the United States if drugs were cut off, the members of the delegation indicated this would not be the case. It was suggested that designer drugs, in particular, provide the possibility of a smorgasbord of highs. Natural illicit drugs could easily be replaced by these synthetic substances. Moreover, it was indicated that the key to stopping the drug problem was to address the root causes including family disunity and the frustration of young people because of lack of jobs and their not finding a place in society.

Members of the delegation explained the diverse ways in which drugs come into the United States—by land, sea, and air; in containers and on persons. Estimates of the cost of the drug problem to the United States were given as $200 billion in losses to business and $150 to $200 billion in costs to the Federal government.

President Castro related the status of the problems of crime and drugs in Cuba.

With regard to the problem of crime, in general, President Castro spoke of the difficulty of controlling crime in large cities, suggesting that a city such as Mexico City with 20 million people is almost unmanageable. He posed the question: If ten cars were full of drugs, how would it be possible to detect that?

Regarding the problem of crime in Cuba, President Castro estimated that it was one tenth of the crime committed in New York City. Yet, the rate of crime was still higher in Cuban cities than in

the provinces. He expressed concern that the crime rate was still high, although it was 20 percent of other societies. The predominant crimes are robbery and murder—crimes of passion.

The lower crime rate in Cuba was attributed to moral values and ethics. President Castro asserted that the Cuban people are sensitive to crime; they are irritated about threats of violence.

President Castro observed that in the nations of the world there has been a trend toward decriminalization, to reduce sanctions, but that he was seeking a different approach. He indicated he had been studying why youth commit crime. He had found that in Cuba the immediate source of the problem of the children who behaved badly was the family—broken homes, no father—something was wrong in the family.

To respond to the juvenile delinquency problem, Cuba was developing special schools for those with bad behavior, as well as for handicapped children. He indicated that Cuba would require a capacity of 18,000 in these special schools. In addition to the family problems, these children, despite the fact that their intelligence was normal, were hyperactive and almost always had some neurological problems. He expressed the belief, however, that in a normal environment these children could do well. Since the family was not providing that environment, it was up to the schools. If this environment was not provided, these children would come into conflict with society.

Regarding the drug problem, specifically, President Castro indicated that prior to the Revolution marijuana had been grown by smaller farmers in the mountains of Cuba, in amongst the coffee. The farmers did not consume the drugs, but made a small profit. After the Revolution, there was land reform, loans, and schools. The cultivation of marijuana was forbidden. Consequently not only were there sanctions against growing marijuana, but the economic reasons for doing so were removed.

Furthermore, after the Revolution, Cuba was isolated from the rest of the world. This included being isolated from the growing drug problem. Other factors contributing to Cuba's not developing a drug problem, according to President Castro were: the euphoria of the Revolution, the creation of schools and jobs, the collective morale, education, sports, and growing a healthy youth.

President Castro informed the delegation that Cuba had never known a cocaine problem. In the last year prior to the Revolution, some corrupt politicians were said to use cocaine. This was considered the worst that could be said about the person. There was a strong moral rejection of cocaine use.

After the Revolution a cocaine problem did not emerge for several reasons. First, Cuba was isolated. Second, the drug traffickers did not come to Cuba, because people did not have the money to buy drugs.

President Castro indicated that the drug traffickers who did come to Cuba did so when their vessels or aircraft, "unfortunately for them", broke down. He indicated that a total of 399 persons were arrested for drug crimes from 1970 to the present. The breakdown was as follows:

126 Colombians, 110 Americans, 77 Cuban-Americans, 34 Jamaicans, 6 Dominicans, 5 Bermudeans, 9 Haitians, 2 Hondurans, 1 Chilean.

According to President Castro, there are no problems with drugs in Cuba. He suggested there was no country with less of a drug problem. While drug use in Cuba is punished, the number of cases tried each year for marijuana is negligible. There is some abuse of pharmaceuticals, mixing them with alcohol. There is no serious alcohol problem either.

Therefore, within this context—being a nation with no interest in drugs, no economic dependence on drugs—it does not hurt the Cubans to fight drugs. President Castro suggested, however, an alternative approach to the drug problem than a bi-lateral agreement of some kind between the United States and Cuba.

President Castro described the economic situation in Latin America as a crisis because of debts and unequal trade. Because of the narcotics problem in the United States, due to cultivation and production of drugs in Latin America, and the economic situation in Latin America, he suggested there was a common ground for discussions between the U.S. and Latin American nations. He proposed that Latin America would have to say to U.S. "help us with our economic problems and we will help you with the narcotics problem", or the U.S. could say to Latin America "help us with the narcotics and we will help you with your economic problems."

The President told the delegation that he had been discussing the narcotics problems with Latin American leaders. He had found that these governments were being threatened by the drug traffickers and asserted that the governments in Latin America should be doing something about the problem on their own—not something imposed by the United States—for their own moral, national dignity.

President Castro indicated that he wanted to participate in the struggle against drugs, as part of Latin America, rather than bilaterally with the United States, and that he wanted to move toward a global policy. This would mean his talking to Latin Americans, raising awareness, discussing approaches—as a matter of honor, not imposed. He asserted that Cuba could do more as part of Latin America than as an island.

He went on to suggest that the solution to the drug problem in the hemisphere must come out of an analysis through a dialogue between the United States and Latin America over budgets and deficits. Furthermore, President Castro argued that for the United States not to heed the economic problems of Latin America was irresponsible and he asserted that there has to be a new chapter in the relationship between the United States and Latin America.

When queried by members of the delegation, President Castro affirmed that the "Latin American" regional role he proposed for Cuba in the narcotics area did not exclude a bi-lateral relationship with the United States on this matter. What such a bi-lateral relationship could do, at this point in time however, was, he suggested, minimal. His preference was to do more work on the narcotics problem through Latin America.

Based on President Castro's remarks, Chairman Rangel asserted that the Western Hemispheric Summit proposed in the 1988 Anti-

Drug Abuse Act would be consistent with President Castro's approach. He indicated that when the delegation returned to the United States, they would more vigorously pursue this proposal and work out the difficulties.

President Castro reminded the delegation that Cuba had helped solve the U.S. airplane hijacking problem. In Cuba, there were sanctions for hijacking.

Other issues discussed included the question of whether Cuba would cease aiding the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) in El Salvador. President Castro indicated that Cuba could not cease helping its friends, but that El Salvador was a problem that should be negotiated. He referred to the Angolan agreement as a good example of the negotiating approach.

A final concern raised by Mr. Guarini was the issue of political prisoners presently incarcerated in Cuban prisons. A discussion was held on the release of these prisoners and on the human rights issues involved. Mr. Guarini strongly urged the President to adhere to the basic principles of human rights. He also explained that this was an important issue in the United States and the nations of the world. President Castro indicated that consideration would be given to the request and contacts would be made between the proper officials of both governments.

CUBAN RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) The Department of State and the Bush Administration should explore areas of cooperation with Cuba on the matter of drug trafficking.

(2) The delegation urges that there be Cuban involvement in regional activities directed against drug trafficking.

SUMMARY REPORT: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC VISIT

EMBASSY BRIEFING

Ambassador Paul Taylor and staff opened the Dominican Republic leg of the U.S. delegation's visit with a team briefing on narcotics, economics, trade and political developments regarding the Dominican Republic. The primary message gotten across to Members of this briefing was that the current political leadership in this Caribbean island nation takes the drug problem seriously and has given full support to U.S. anti-drug efforts in this region.

Delegation members were told that the Dominican leadership—headed by President Joaquin Balaguer—feared significant inroads by narcotics traffickers because of its ideal location. The Dominican Republic is often cited as a "model citizen" in the Caribbean when it comes to drug enforcement. The country boasts two highly sophisticated radar tracking systems with a third to be added soon. A joint military-police information cooperative called the Joint Information Coordination Center is also cited throughout the Caribbean as an innovative weapon in the war on drug traffickers operating in the region.

The Embassy Team informed the delegation Members that the Dominican Republic is not a major producer of narcotics, conse-

quently, there are no crop substitution programs that Members of Congress could consider either starting or augmenting.

Legislatively, the Dominican Republic just passed a major anti-narcotics bill which creates a national Narcotics Board which reports directly to President Balaguer.

An immigration official (U.S.) reported to the delegation that there was no hard evidence to support a link between drug trafficking and the flow of illegal aliens. However, there continued to be concerns about the potential for trafficking networks set up via the so-called "yoleros"—illegal Dominicans who pack into small boats (or "yolag") headed for the U.S. via Puerto Rico or via larger vessels that pick them up.

DEA's country representative told the U.S. delegation that there does not appear to be a Dominican Republic-to-New York narcotics network in operation as most all Dominicans in the U.S. obtain their drugs domestically. However, the DEA representative informed the Members that there were problems in getting the Dominican Republic to extradite some of its nationals to the U.S. for drug violations because of the existence of a strong sense of nationalism. But officials in the Dominican Republic are willing to arrange the extradition of non-nationals.

The feeling of U.S. Embassy Team officials was that this attitude would change for the better once the extradition treaty that is being negotiated between the U.S. and the Dominican Republic is finalized, hopefully in the coming months.

The Committee received a briefing on many non-narcotic matters as well. The most important non-narcotics issue raised on the briefing agenda were as follows:

(1) The Dominican Republic continues to feel the strains of substantially reduced sugar quotas by the U.S.

(2) There has been no U.S. military aid such as the Military Assistance Program (MAP), in either Fiscal 1987 or Fiscal 1988.

(3) The Dominican Republic continues to suffer short-term economic problems related to unemployment and underemployment, as well as a widening trade deficit. For temporary relief, a period of very strict exchange control is in force.

(4) The custom of U.S.-resident Dominicans sending back "remittances" to their families and country continues. Estimates are that about $260 million this year has come to the Dominican Republic *legally,* most as direct transfers to families. Estimates run as high as $800 million when the illegal and unaccounted for amounts are factored in.

(5) Various forms of immigration fraud continue, as the Dominican Republic remains the largest immigration visa issuing post in the world, A total of 144,000 visa applications are pending. A new trend is the rising number of "upscale" Dominicans who are attempting to come to the U.S.

(6) Despite problems related to the sugar quota cuts, the Dominican Republic has fared better than any other nation involved in the Caribbean Basin Initiative legislation.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT JOAQUIN AMPARO BALAGUER

After the Narcotics Country Team briefing the delegation went to the Presidential Palace for a meeting with Dominican President Joaquin Amparo Balaguer. The President is a well-known intellectual and author and served previous terms as President (1960–62 and 1966–78).

Dr. Balaguer welcomed the delegation and thanked them for being advocates for the Dominican Republic in Congress. Mr. Rangel, in turn, stated the delegation's pleasure to be in the Dominican Republic and was particularly pleased with the priority placed on combating drug trafficking by the Dominican Government. The Chairman pointed out to Dr. Balaguer that wherever the Select Committee travels, it points to the Dominican Republic as a "model of what a nation can do to combat drug trafficking." Mr. Rangel also pointed out that he has many Dominicans residing in his congressional district—the great majority of them being decent, hard working people. He told the President that it was unfortunate that a small number commit drug-related or other crimes and tarnish the name of the Dominican community in the United States. Mr. Rangel indicated, however, that there exists excellent cooperation between U.S., New York and Dominican authorities in the identification of these violators. The Chairman urged swift agreement between the Dominican Republic and the United States that would permit mutual extradition of each country's nationals to face charges in the other country.

Mr. Rangel turned his remarks to economic matters. He pointed out that the delegation included Mr. Guarini, who serves as Chairman of Congressional Friends of the Caribbean, which includes 78 Members of the U.S. Congress. The Chairman urged continued Dominican participation in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and that the Congress was committed to supporting the economic goals of the Dominican people. In a concluding point, Mr. Rangel pointed out that the Tax Exchange Treaty, to be signed by participating nations to be eligible for some CBI benefits, could be tailored to meet the needs of the laws of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Gilman, in his remarks to the President, underscored the need for regional solidarity to combat drug trafficking. He urged President Balaguer to take a leadership role in a Caribbean effort to combat drug trafficking and offered the help of the Select Committee in this regard. Mr. Gilman also urged the President to encourage Caribbean nations to increase their contribution to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC).

In his responding remarks, President Balaguer stated that cooperation with the U.S. on both narcotics and trade issues must go forward. In this regard he stated he will move quickly to close discussion on both the draft extradiction treaty and the Tax Exchange Treaty. The President also expressed his thanks to the delegation for the recent modification of the Dominican sugar quota to the U.S. for the coming year, and how that will greatly assist their economic efforts. He thanked the delegation for the visit and pledged continued cooperation with the U.S. on narcotics control.

JICC VISIT

Members of the U.S. delegation received a short, but detailed briefing on the site at the Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC) in Santo Domingo. The JICC information gathering system is the cornerstone of the war on drugs in the Dominican Republic and is regarded by many other Caribbean nations as a model outfit.

The briefing tour was led by DEA's country representative who explained to the delegation that the primary purpose of JICC is to track the in and out movements of private aircraft and vessels, border crossings and passengers on commercial flights. The information gleaned from these trackings is used to develop data banks within the Dominican Republic. The data is also shared with other countries that have an interest in narcotics interdiction. Included in this group is the United States, which received many pieces of JICC information at the similarly-styled El Paso Information Center (EPIC), for the U.S. narcotics investigations. Actually, the Dominican Republic JICC is modeled after the EPIC system in the U.S.

The three branches of the Dominican Republic military all work together in the development of JICC-produced information, the delegation was told. The Army's primary responsibility is to keep track of the comings and goings of international airline passengers. The Air Force helps track general aviation arrivals, while the Navy leads the effort to track sailing vessels in and out of Dominican Republic ports.

Members of the U.S. delegation were also told about two radar systems in place to help in the JICC information gathering process. One is located at Cabo Rojo, and the other at San Isidro. A third radar site is being planned, the delegation was told, probably in 1990.

The feeling expressed to the delegation by the DEA country representative was that JICC had played a major role in decreased general aviation traffic coming in to the Dominican Republic. Much of the general aviation traffic that once came through the Dominican Republic appears to be diverting to Haiti, the Members were told.

More than 20,000 entries are in JICC's data banks. This capacity is expected to triple when the existing computer set up is replaced with a network system. Officials hope to have the network operational within six months.

In addition to representatives from the Dominican Republic armed forces, the Dominican National Police and the National Directorate of Investigations (DNI) also contribute personnel to the three-year-old JICC, the U.S. delegation was told during the tour.

Members of the delegation were so enamored by the JICC set up that they strongly advised Dominican Republic officials to reach out and offer their assistance and expertise to the authorities in Haiti, Jamaica and the Bahamas, all who reportedly have expressed an interest in getting a central information processing center operational.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) The U.S. should consider making a sizeable contribution to the establishment of mass information- and intelligence-processing centers, like the Dominican Republic's JICC, in other Caribbean nations.

(2) The U.S. should seek to provide whatever assistance may be necessary to get a third tracking radar operational within the Dominican Republic, by the government target of 1990.

(3) Given the large influx of Dominican Republic nationals in and out of the United States, U.S. drug enforcement authorities may want to establish a tighter working relationship with immigration and Naturalization officials on an exchange of information that could benefit drug investigations.

(4) Given the strong military involvement in the war on drugs in the Dominican Republic, the Congress may want to consider re-establishing MAP funds for this nation, as greater protection against any loss of military readiness that may result from the military's anti-drug activities.

GUYANA

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HOYTE/CABINET MINISTER

The U.S. Congressional delegation's visit to Guyana on December 17, 1988, was the first of its kind in at least 10 years, to this small country located on the northern coast of South America. Because of the significance of the visit and a professed desire by the Guyanese to do more to combat drug trafficking and drug abuse in the region the delegation was well received during its one-day stay.

Upon arrival at Georgetown, the U.S. delegation was met by Ambassador Theresa Tull and other Embassy officials. Ambassador Tull provided an overview briefing on Guyana prior to the delegation's meeting with Guyana President Hoyte.

Ambassador Tull informed delegation members in her briefing that no DEA personnel was assigned to Guyana, but the country's drug situation was monitored by a Venezuelan-based DEA agent who made two or three trips there annually. The Ambassador also related to the delegation that some of the marijuana being cultivated in Guyana was actually destined for the U.S. Overall, Ambassador Tull gave Guyana high marks for its anti-drug efforts.

The U.S. delegation then proceeded to a meeting with President H.E. Desmond Hoyte and other senior officials of the Guyana government. For more than an hour, the U.S. delegation and the Guyana representatives discussed the narcotics situation in Guyana as well as the problem experienced with illicit drugs throughout the region. A number of economic and political matters were also taken up during the meeting—Guyana's problem with the abuse of and trafficking in illicit drugs is often over shadowed by the narcotics problem experienced by better known countries in the region. Nevertheless, President Hoyte informed the delegation during the meeting that Guyana has seen an increase in marijuana use as well as a trend toward cocaine being transited through the country. President Hoyte also stated that there appeared to be a rise in Guyana's marijuana crop (probably commensurate with the

increase in marijuana use), and that the harder drugs like cocaine and heroin were still believed to be entering the country from border nations Brazil and Venezuela.

Guyana's President promised the U.S. delegation that his country was poised to use all its resources to combat the international drug crisis from gaining a further foothold in the country. Guyana's strategy, as outlined by the President, combines legislation, enforcement, education and regional cooperation.

President Hoyte informed the delegation that he presently chairs a national committee on drug abuse. The committee is made up of representatives from various national agencies such as Customs, the Police and the Army. Guyana also participates in the anti-drug efforts spearheaded by the formalized Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which has set up a special committee of its membership to work the drug issue. In other areas of international cooperation, Guyana has signed formal extradition treaties with Brazil and Venezuela and has kept up its relationship with enforcement agencies in the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. the U.S. delegation was told.

President Hoyte pointed to an anti-narcotics bill passed in 1988 as the latest tool in Guyana's war on drugs. The legislation has been described as having tough penalties that allow for property confiscation and is considered one of the toughest in the region.

In closing the meeting, the U.S. delegation recommended to Guyana that it step up cooperative efforts aimed at blunting such trafficker tactics as money laundering and fugitive flight to countries with our extradition treaties.

PRESS CONFERENCE WITH GUYANA MEDIA

Following its meeting with President Hoyte and the Guyanese cabinet, the U.S. delegation moved to another location in Georgetown for the press conference with the local media. In a session that lasted about 30 minutes—attracting both electronic and print coverage—Chairman Rangel and the U.S. delegation explained U.S. drug policy to about 30 reporters who had gathered.

Chairman Rangel opened the news conference by stating that Guyana President Hoyte had visited the United States in September 1988. The Chairman noted that historically, relations between Guyana and the U.S. have not been as close as either party would have liked, but said the Hoyte government was working toward closer ties, and he applauded Guyana's recent anti-drug efforts.

Among the issues addressed at the press conference were military support for anti-drug efforts in Caribbean nations, knowledge or suspicion of high-level involvement in narcotics trafficking, the relationship between economic and drug issues, and the level of anti-drug cooperation received from socialist-bloc countries. The news media representatives also inquired about specifics of the 1988 anti-drug law in the U.S., as well as what changes could be expected with the change of administration in the U.S. Reports after the U.S. delegation departed Guyana indicate extensive, upbeat media coverage on the U.S. visit.

The delegation ended its visit with an official reception hosted by Ambassador Tull, at her residence, with President Hoyte and other Guyanese officials in attendance.

GUYANA RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) Relevant committees of the U.S. Congress, officials of the Administration as well as U.S. drug enforcement authorities should monitor developments in Guyana on a route basis.

(2) The presence of the Venezuela-based U.S. DEA agent should be increased in Guyana from two to three times annually to preferably once a month, as a greater deterrent to those involved in the drug trade.

(3) The network of U.S. drug authorities throughout the Caribbean should make a special effort to include Guyana in on any information exchange or intelligence-sharing, as it may benefit their own in-country efforts to clamp down on drug abusers and drug traffickers.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

DECEMBER 19, 1988

Embassy Briefing, Trinidad

The United States Embassy in Trinidad and Tobago is headed by Ambassador Charles A. Gargano. On December 19th Ambassador Gargano and his staff provided a briefing for the delegation on the general economic, political, and social situation in Trinidad and Tobago and the dimensions of the narcotics problems.

Trinidad and Tobago has a 4 billion dollar gross domestic product (GDP), a highly educated and entrepreneurial population of 1.2 million, rich oil and gas deposits, a heavy industrial infrastructure, and ample land for agriculture. It has all the resources necessary for a viable economy. The country is currently, however, experiencing difficult times, because of its oil based economy which has been sluggish due to low oil prices during the last decade. The GDP per capita dropped precipitously from a high in 1982 of almost $7,000 to $3,700 in 1987. The nation ran a public sector deficit for the first time in twenty years in 1986.

Actions have been taken in the last few months to confront the economic problems. These have included: a 16 percent devaluation of currency, an increase in gas and oil prices, a rescheduling of private sector debts, a planned rescheduling of public sector debts, a planned reduction in public sector jobs, and a request for assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Trinidad and Tobago has received a loan under the IMF compensatory financing facility.

Most economic assistance from the United States has come from the private sector. In fact, Trinidad and Tobago is in a favorable balance of trade situation with the United States, with a balance of trade of $275 billion in their favor.

Coincident with Trinidad and Tobago's economic problems is a growing drug problem. Trinidad and Tobago appears to be becoming a cocaine transit point between Venezuela and the Virgin Islands because of its proximity to the source of cocaine, its wealth, and the extensive airline connections available.

Cocaine enters the country by way of small fast boats. It is taken out in luggage or on parts of the body. It is, however, difficult to determine the extent of cocaine transshipment that is occurring because of the inadequacy of available narcotics intelligence. An esti-

mated 20 kilos of cocaine is seized per year; 12 kilos were seized in December 1988, the largest seizure to date. Trinidad and Tobago claims that crack, a free-base form of cocaine that can be smoked, originated there. Moreover, increased cocaine use has paralleled the decline in the economy of the country, as indicated by growing admissions for treatment for cocaine abuse.

Marijuana is cultivated in Trinidad and Tobago. Eradication efforts are limited because of resources. Eradication essentially is being done by hand with machetes, slash and burn. There is some aerial surveillance, but no sophisticated spraying of these crops.

Trinidadian drug enforcement efforts, including the mobility of personnel and communications, are hindered by a lack of resources. There are also many legal constraints on enforcement efforts. This includes no effective witness protection program, no undercover operations or wiretaps, and no plea bargaining.

For its anti-narcotics efforts Trinidad and Tobago receives assistance from both the United States and the United Kingdom. British assistance includes marijuana eradication equipment and narcotics sniffing dogs. A letter of agreement exists between the U.S. and Trinidad and Tobago, which provides a $10,000 grant for equipment for patrol boats.

There is no permanent U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration office; the country falls under the jurisdiction of DEA's Caracas, Venezuela office. A DEA office in Trinidad and Tobago has been requested.

Areas of needed assistance identified include: training by DEA, Customs, and Coast Guard; help in setting up an intelligence center; a DEA agent in Trinidad/Tobago; and MAP funds to keep the Trinidad/Tobago Coast Guard going by providing spare parts and engines.

Meeting with Narcotics Law Enforcement Officials, December 19, 1988

The delegation met with representatives of the Ministries involved in anti-narcotics efforts. The participants from the ministries were directly involved in program implementation.

The briefing by the Trinidadians was led by Lyle Williams, Director, Political Division, Ministry of External Affairs. Formal presentations were given by Dr. Peter Lewis, Chairman of TACADA (Technical Advisory Committee on Alcohol and Drug Abuse); Colonel Ralph Brown, Commander of Trinidad and Tobago Regiment, overseer of the army and Coast Guard drug eradication program; Mr. Anthony Carmona, Department of Public Prosecutions; and Senior Superintendent David Jack, Chief of the Narcotics Squad of the Police Service.

Other Trinidadian officials in attendance included: Francis McBarrett, Narcotics Office, Ministry of External Affairs, Director of Multilateral Affairs; Colonel Joseph Theodore, Advisor to Minister of National Security; Lt. Colonel Hugh Vidal, Commander First Battalion Regiment; Lionel Remy, Ministry of Health; Lt. Commander Kayam Mohammed, XO, Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard; Vidia Ramktelawan, Office of the Prime Minister, Technical Coop Unit; Assistant Superintendent Victor Walcon, Deputy Chief, Narcotics Squad of Police Service; Kenneth Superville,

Deputy Chief, Customs Preventive Division; and Herman Brown, Immigration Division.

The Trinidadian organizational structure for anti-narcotics efforts consists of the Interspectorial Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse (ISCADA), which formulates policy at the ministerial level; the Technical Advisory Committee on Alcohol and Drug Abuse (TASCADA), which is the working level group that advises the council; and a three member secretariat, with a budget of $120,000, to serve TACADA and ISCADA.

Trinidad's location near South America makes it an ideal transshipment country for cocaine. Cannabis and "mandrax" (methaqualone), have been used traditionally. Cocaine abuse, especially in the form of crack, has become a serious problem in the 1980's. Crack has replaced "mandrax" use. Cocaine arrests increased from 5 in 1980 to 690 in 1985. Young adults aged 25 are the most frequent abusers. Treatment facilities are seeing a growing number of cocaine admissions with less than 100 in 1981 and 1982 and more than one thousand in 1987.

The increase in crime in the country is attributable to increased drug use. The last five years has seen a dramatic increase in violent crime associated with the drug trade.

There are 231 cases of AIDS in Trinidad, a significant rate when compared to the total population of one million people. According to Dr. Lewis, although the source of the problem is not intravenous drug abuse, it is associated with drug abuse. He suggested that AIDS was associated with multiple sex partners as a result of cocaine use.

Factors contributing to the drug trafficking and abuse problem in Trinidad and Tobago include: the location of trafficking routes, the drop in per capita income, the low price of available cocaine ($10 Trinidad and Tobago or $2-3 U.S. per rock), the high level of purity of the cocaine and the low incidence of contamination, and the high incidence of cocaine smoking rather than snorting.

The government of Trinidad and Tobago has sought to respond to the drug problem. In 1983, a national commission comprised of representatives from the public and private sectors was mandated to develop a plan of action. The plan was approved in June of 1985 and included provisions for enforcement, treatment, prevention, and research. Institutions were created to carry out the established policies—TACADA, ISCADA, and the secretariat. These organizations operate out of the Prime Minister's Office and the Chairman of the Council reports directly to the Prime Minister.

Legislation is being developed that includes penalties for drug cultivation and trafficking, provisions for treatment, and asset forfeiture provision. There is a great deal of interest in developing an asset forfeiture program to take the profit out of narcotics trafficking.

Current anti-narcotics initiatives include: a new building and additional staff for the Narcotics Bureau, special investigation teams in Customs, use of sniffer dogs at PIARCO Airport, training courses with DEA, joint army and police eradication efforts, and intensified surveillance.

In the demand area, the Ministry of Education is developing drug education models for the primary and secondary schools.

Some have been implemented. Community oriented anti-drug prevention programs are being promoted. With the onslaught of the cocaine crisis, there has been a demand to expand treatment beds.

In the area of research, a school survey was conducted in 1985. No household survey has been conducted because of the expense of such a project.

The Government's goals in the area of narcotics are to:

Improve the surveillance and intelligence capability of law enforcement (a JICC is needed);

Develop community programs to promote an anti-drug life style program;

Improve treatment facilities; and

Increase research.

Donors have been approached for financial support, because the government does not have the needed resources to carry out this effort. Trinidad and Tobago is also interested in bilateral and multilateral anti-narcotics efforts.

Commenting on the overview of the narcotics situation and the anti-narcotics efforts of the government, Mr. Rangel suggested that the delegation had come as friends and wanted to help and not to interfere with their efforts. He outlined the provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 to indicate how the United States was dealing with the narcotics problem legislatively.

Commander Brown described the marijuana eradication program. As of March 1988, the armed forces may become involved in one of two ways—either the police may invite their support or, if military intelligence indicated a problem, the police are brought in to support the operation. Between March and September 1988, 140,000 U.S. dollars worth of marijuana has been destroyed. These operations include surveillance, moving in of ground troops, slash and burn operations. Because of the cost, more sophisticated methods, such as aerial eradication, are not used.

Despite equipment limitations, the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard is involved in and has been highly successful in apprehending cocaine smugglers. Brown also underscored the need for a JICC intelligence unit to improve interdiction and apprehension efforts.

At the prosecutorial level, a two pronged approach to improve these efforts was identified—legislation and training. A key area of legislative efforts to enhance prosecutorial efforts is asset forfeiture.

A number of legal requisites making prosecutions difficult were identified. One problem in current law that hinders narcotics prosecution is the fact that the standards of evidence do not permit the introduction of evidence from outside the country. Prosecution forensic experts cannot accept foreign certificates of validity for evidence sent from abroad. The asset seizure bill would permit the admission of foreign police records. A second problem identified is that the infrastructure is not prepared to deal with money laundering.

Other provisions in Trinidad and Tobago law, however, make prosecutions less difficult, e.g., if one gram of cocaine or 15 grams of marijuana are found on an individual, the burden of proof shifts to the defense to show how possession came about. Illegal evidence, even if secured without a warrant, is admissible in court. There is

a witness protection program, but witnesses are not given new identities. Legislation has been passed to prevent the corruption of the judicial bench.

After the presentations by the Trinidadian officials, the members of the U.S. delegation commented and raised a number of questions. Chairman Rangel asserted that although Trinidad and Tobago did not have the monumental drug problem faced by the United States, the government of the Trinidad and Tobago, while limited by resources, had attacked the problem seriously and impressively.

Mr. Gilman reviewed the provisions of the omnibus drug legislation that dealt with Western Hemispheric regional initiatives, including the training centers and international drug courts, and a drug summit. He suggested that there be support for the development of an intelligence center in Trinidad and Tobago similar to the JICC in the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Guarini inquired as to the nature of the problems that inhibited the development of a witness protection program. He was told it was difficult to change a person's identity on an island where most people knew each other.

Mr. Rangel inquired about conspiracy statutes. He was informed that there were conspiracy provisions, but that they were in the common law not statutes.

Mr. Hughes indicated that importance of having legislative provisions in several critical areas if anti-narcotics efforts were to be successful. These included legal wiretaps, a witness protection program, money laundering statutes, extradition agreements to deny refuge to traffickers, and asset forfeiture provisions. He also suggested that the shift in the burden of proof found in Trinidad and Tobago law might work well. He indicated that in the United States the burden of going forward had been shifted in asset forfeiture cases, requiring the defendant to prove that a particular asset had not been acquired with illegally procured funds. Mr. Hughes also suggested that in the area of witness protection, larger countries might help island states by providing refuge for ex-witnesses.

The Trinidadian officials informed the delegation that there was little plea bargaining in Trinidad and Tobago and that wiretapping was illegal in Trinidad and Tobago because it infringed on privacy. Superintendent Jack suggested exploring the possibility that witnesses in need of protection in Trinidad and Tobago might be relocated in the United States. The Superintendent indicated the need for Trinidad and Tobago to be linked into a better communications system. Cooperation between the Coast Guard, Customs, and Defense makes the task easier, even with the lack of resources, according to the Superintendent. He concluded with the proposition that the U.S. and Trinidad and Tobago could assist each other—if the drug problem is arrested in the Caribbean, the "octopus" will not reach U.S. shores.

Trinidad and Tobago, Meeting with Prime Minister A.N.R. Robinson, December 19, 1988, Trinidad

Members of the delegation met with Prime Minister A.N.R. Robinson. The Prime Minister was accompanied by former Ambassador Maurice St. John.

Prime Minister Robinson indicated to the delegation his support for global narcotics efforts. One such international initiative recommended by the Prime Minister was an international court to try drug traffickers. This proposal was advocated by the United States Senate in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The Prime Minister suggested that the court need not necessarily be an actual physical court. It could be a treaty that allowed for the trafficker to be tried in a court located where the individual was arrested, but then subject to the provisions in the treaty.

The court, according to the Prime Minister, might provide a good mechanism for resolving disputes and allegations against public officials of one country by another, a problem raised in a letter to President Reagan from the Caricom (Caribbean Community) nations earlier this year. In July 1988, during their annual summit, leaders of thirteen Caricom nations wrote to President Reagan complaining that the United States was becoming overzealous in its attempts to curb illicit drug trafficking, including: overreaching itself; indulging in extra-territorial jurisdiction; undermining the sovereignty of country of the region; and especially, making public the accusations against individuals outside the United States by persons who were often convicted felons without regard for the right of the accused person.

Congressman Rangel also expressed his support for the concept of the court. He suggested that the court "could bring countries closer together and would indicate recognition of the fact that drug traffickers ignore all international boundaries."

The Prime Minister also spoke of the economic problems being confronted by Trinidad and Tobago. The nation is in a state of negative growth. The rate of unemployment is high and is expected to rise further before the situation improves. The debt problems of Trinidad and Tobago are exacerbated by the fact that Guyana owes it a significant debt; the economic situation of Trinidad and Tobago would be markedly improved if this debt were repaid.

Prime Minister Robinson also reported the ways in which he intended to confront the nation's economic problems. Strict economic restraints are to be instituted. Government spending in all areas is to be cut by 10 percent for all government programs. To date, the people of Trinidad and Tobago have supported the measures proposed and instituted by the government to address the economic crisis.

Trinidad and Tobago, Meeting with Members Parliamentarians, December 19, 1988

Members of the U.S. delegation met with Members of the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago. The Parliamentarians were led by Nizam Mohammed, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Michael Williams, President of the Senate. Other Members of the Parliament in attendance included: Patrick Manning, Leader of the Opposition and Political Leader of the Peoples' National Movement (PNM); Gloria Henry, National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) party member and Minister of Community Development, Welfare, and the Status of Women; John Humphrey, leader of CLUBB 88 a faction of NAR which is forming a new political party; Jennifer Johnson, Minister of Youth, Sport and Culture, and NAR MP;

Joseph Toney, NAR MP and Minister in Ministery of National Security. Augustus Ramrekersingh, PNM Senator and Leader of the Opposition in the Senate; Sahadeo Basdeo, NAR Senator and Minister of External Affairs and International Trade; Fr. Winston Joseph, Episcopalian priest and independent Senator; and Alloy le Quay, NAR Senator and Leader for Government Business in the Senate.

The meeting was conducted as small group roundtable discussions.

RECOMMENDATIONS—TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

(1) The Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Customs, and U.S. Coast Guard should prepare reports on the status of narcotics trafficking in relation to Trinidad and Tobago. Patterns of trafficking should continue to be monitored to determine any increase in the use of Trinidad and Tobago as a transshipment point.

(2) U.S. should support the training of Trinidad and Tobago antinarcotics personnel, at the request of the government of Trinidad and Tobago.

(3) All due consideration should be given to the awarding of MAP funds to support the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard's drug interdiction efforts.

(4) A thorough review should be made to determine whether a DEA agent should be placed in Trinidad and Tobago. If an agent is not placed, efforts should be made to increase DEA monitoring of the drug trafficking situation in Trinidad and Tobago.

(5) U.S. should support development of JICC intelligence network in Trinidad and Tobago and the linking of such networks throughout the Caribbean.

VENEZUELA

Because of the importance of Venezuela as a transshipment point for both cocaine and precursor chemicals, the delegation decided to make a stop in Caracas on December 20, 1988, on its return to Washington to discuss narcotics control efforts in Venezuela with U.S. Ambassador Otto Reich and DEA Country Attaché Annabelle Grimm-Marin.

In 1988, the Venezuelan military increased its presence in the border region to impede narcotics traffic and insurgent activity originating from Colombia. DEA estimates that approximately 15–20 tons of cocaine transit Venezuela each year. The Venezuelan National Guard (FAC) manually eradicates the coca and cannibis cultivations it discovers. Cultivation of both drugs is small.

The delegation was concerned with the fact that the DEA country office in Venezuela is also responsible for Guyana, French Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago. In light of the increased cocaine trafficking threat that faces Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, the committee strongly urges that DEA review its staffing levels and assignments in Latin America to insure that all threatened areas are staffed with the necessary personnel.

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